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Gradualism in Coordination and Trust Building 
 
ABSTRACT 
        Coordination  and  cooperation  on  public projects, as well as trust among society 
members are important for economic, social and political activities. This dissertation 
presents essays on the role of gradualism – increasing the stakes of projects slowly over time 
rather than starting with large-stake projects immediately – in coordination and trust 
building under various settings. The first two essays are on simultaneous coordination games 
when there are multiple equilibria in the one-shot game; the third essay is on sequential trust 
games when the only subgame perfect equilibrium in the one-shot game predicts that no 
cooperation occurs at all. 
          The  first  essay, One Step at  A  Time: Does Gradualism Build Coordination?  (joint 
withSam Asher, Lorenzo Casaburi, and Plamen Nikolov), uses a multiple-period binary-
choice weakest-link coordination experiment and finds that gradualism  leads to better 
coordination in high-stake projects. The findings point to a voluntary mechanism to promote 
coordination when the capacity to impose sanctions is limited. 
        This  second  essay, Gradualism, Weakest Link and Information: Theory and 
Coordination Experiments, extends the first essay and compares the effects of gradualism 
under various information and payoff structures. It proposes a belief-based learning 
framework to explore why and when gradualism may help coordination. It compares the role 
of gradualism in two weakest-link games under two different information structures: a iv 
 
limited information structure when subjects are only informed whether all group members 
contribute, and a richer information structure when they are informed exactly how many 
group members contribute. It finds that richer information feedback facilitates later 
coordination for the big-bang approach when a group is close to success, thus shrinking the 
advantage of gradualism. Finally, in a third experiment it finds that allowing free riding 
worsens coordination in all treatments, and gradualism with imperfect monitoring does not 
perform better. 
        The  third  essay, Does Gradualism Build Trust? Evidence from A Multi-round 
Experiment, examines the effect of gradualism in trust building using a multi-round binary-
choice trust (investment) experiment. It finds that gradualism leads to higher trustworthiness 
at the beginning and higher subsequent trust. However, trustworthiness and trust for all 
treatments sharply decrease in the end; even gradualism cannot avoid this end-of-game 
effect. 
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1. ONE STEP AT A TIME: DOES GRADUALISM BUILD 
COORDINATION?
1 
 
1.1.  Introduction  
        Coordination
2 is important for daily economic, social and political activities (Schelling, 
1960; Arrow, 1974). Yet, coordination failure is common (Van Huyck et al., 1990; Cooper 
et al., 1990; Knez & Camerer, 1994, 2000; Cachon & Camerer, 1996). Such failure can have 
a large impact on social welfare, as has been explored in multiple subfields of economics 
and political science: in economic development (Ray, 1998; Bardhan, 2005), in the business 
cycle (Cooper & John, 1988), in international monetary policy (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009), 
and in the establishment of democracy and rule of law (Weingast, 1997). 
        Although  there  have  been  many  insightful  studies
3  on how to promote successful 
coordination, a central question remains unsolved: when the capacity to impose sanctions 
and social pressure is limited, to establish a high level of voluntary coordination, should we 
choose a big-bang approach – starting with the high hard-to-achieve task – or should we 
                                                 
1 This is a joint work with Sam Asher, Lorenzo Casaburi and Plamen Nikolov. 
 
2 In game theory, coordination refers to resolving which equilibrium to play when there are multiple 
equilibria. In this chapter, we focus on those coordination games with Pareto-ranked equilibria, 
especially weakest-link (minimum-effort) coordination games. 
 
3  Some studies find sanction institutions, social pressure and reputation to be mechanisms that 
promote cooperation (e.g., Olson, 1971; Ostrom et al., 1992; Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Masclet et al., 
2003; Gächter & Herrmann, 2010; Bochet et al., 2006; Carpenter, 2007). Others explore methods to 
facilitate coordination when sanction and social pressure cannot be imposed, such as repetition with 
fixed group members (Clark & Sefton, 2001), complete information structure (Brandts & Cooper, 
2006a), communication (Cooper et al., 1992; Charness, 2000; Weber et al., 2001; Duffy & Feltovich, 
2002; Chaudhuri et al., 2009), and between-group competition (Bornstein et al., 2002; Riechmann & 
Weimann, 2008). 
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coordinate first on small and easy-to-achieve goals? Does a success with a small goal 
guarantee an immediate success with a high objective of coordination, or should the 
objective grow slowly? For example, the European Union (EU) is the result of decades of 
negotiation.
4 Yet the current economic concerns in the EU bring fresh debates (e.g., Alesina 
& Giavazzi, 2010; Baldwin et al., 2010) on whether the establishment of the EU and the 
Euro Zone was a hasty job, given that the standard monetary economics theory has 
suggested that the level of integration within the EU countries is not high enough to qualify 
it an optimal currency area and coordination on economic (especially fiscal) policy will be 
difficult (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2009). This question also applies for domestic reforms 
which involve substantial levels of coordination, and has been one (although not the only) 
key issue in the transition from a planned economy to a market economy (Dewatripont & 
Roland, 1992, 1995; Wei, 1997), and in the democratization process (e.g., Weingast, 1997).
5  
        This Chapter aims to address this question and study gradualism within a fixed-size 
group,
6  a natural and voluntary mechanism to promote coordination where sanction and 
social pressure are absent. We refer to gradualism as the hypothesis that allowing agents to 
coordinate first on small and easy-to-achieve goals and increasing the level of goals slowly 
                                                 
4 Increased coordination level and organization growth are two key features in the EU development. 
The former is the focus of our study; Weber (2006) examines the latter. This history of European 
Union goes back 60 years to when in the 1950s the European Coal and Steel Community served as 
the first step towards the development of a European political union, starting with the free-trade 
arrangement (the Common Market) and leading eventually to the creation of the European Economic 
and Monetary Union that embodies the euro. A detailed introduction of the EU history can be found 
at: http://europa.eu/about-eu/eu-history/index_en.htm. 
 
5 Of course, economic and political reforms are not just about coordination. A full study of the 
optimal path of such reforms is beyond the scope of this chapter.  
 
6 In the real world, group size may also change. Our paper is focused on the case of a fixed-size 
group or the shorter horizon when the group size has not yet changed. For gradual organizational 
growth, see Weber (2006). A full comparison of Weber’s study and ours can be found in Section 1.2.  
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facilitates later coordination on otherwise hard-to-achieve outcomes. We can first find its 
application in intra-organization team building (e.g., new employees are given small initial 
tasks to help build coordination, which makes sure that they can coordinate well in larger 
tasks later), inter-organization cooperation and international relations. Examples of 
international relations include the development of international trade agreements such as the 
World Trade Organization (WTO),
7 international arms reduction agreements, and regional 
and international environmental cooperation. In these international agreements, besides a 
final target (e.g., for arms, tariff or pollution reduction), there is often a series of slowly 
growing targets in each phase for the international community to examine how countries 
fulfill the requirements in each phase. 
        Of course, weakest-link is not always the only payoff structure in these examples (e.g., 
free riding is sometimes possible.) However, in this chapter we focus on the weakest-link 
coordination problem, the significance of which has been recognized in the literature 
aforementioned. A case when free riding is possible is studied in Chapter 2. 
        To test the gradualism hypothesis, we conduct a computer-based laboratory experiment 
with repeated interactions which stylizes (but not replicates) a typical coordination setting in 
the real world. In each period, subjects are endowed with some points (monetary units in the 
laboratory) and are asked to contribute a given amount (which we call stake) to a group 
project. She can only choose to contribute exactly this amount or nothing to the group 
project, but not another amount. The path of the stake, which may or may not change over 
periods, is determined by the treatment she is assigned to. In each period, each member 
realizes an extra return only when all group members contribute to the project; otherwise 
                                                 
7 Like the EU, The development of the WTO involves two aspects: the level of cooperation, and the 
change in the number of members. This study focuses on the first.   4 
 
each ends up with only the points that she does not give. This set-up is generally referred to 
as the minimum-effort or weakest-link coordination games: the payoff depends on one’s 
effort and the minimum effort of group members. Our setting simplifies the payoff function
8 
and, specifically, it is a multi-period stag hunt game due to the binary-choice feature in each 
period.
9 
        We  introduce  three  main  treatments  of stake patterns, which differ in the first six 
periods but have an identical stake for the final six periods. The first treatment has a constant 
high stake for all 12 periods; we call this “Big Bang.”  The second treatment has a constant 
low stake for the first six periods and jumps to the high stake for the final six periods; we 
call this “Semi-gradualism.”  Finally, in the “Gradualism” treatment, the stake gradually 
increases in each of the first six periods until it reaches the high stake in period 7. (See 
Figure 1.1 for a graphical illustration.) Note that the “Semi-gradualism” treatment falls 
between the “Big Bang” and “Gradualism” treatments: its stake starts at low but has a 
sudden increase. Exploiting this design, we test the effect of gradualism on coordination at a 
high stake.  
                                                 
8 The literature of these games generally uses a complex matrix of payoff: there are seven choices of 
actions, and the payoff depends on own action and the minimum action of others. See Van Huyck et 
al. (1990), Knez and Camerer (1994, 2000), Cachon and Camerer (1996), Weber (2006), and 
Chaudhuri et al. (2009).  
 
9 It is similar to a standard discrete public good game, except that our set-up does not offer an 
opportunity for any individual to free ride. Free riding is generally considered as a necessary feature 
of a public good game in the experimental economics literature. However, our set-up also belongs to 
the “weakest-link public goods game” as described by several theoretical and experimental papers on 
public goods (e.g., Hirshleifer, 1983; Harrison & Hirshleifer, 1989; Cornes & Hartley, 2007). Cornes 
and Hartley (2007) provide a general social composition function of public goods with input of 
individual gifts, which incorporates standard continuous public goods, standard discrete public 
goods, weak-link (and weakest-link) public goods, good-shot (and best-shot) public goods, etc.  5 
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The vertical line between periods 6 and 7 separates the two halves of the first stage; coordination 
performances of different treatments in the second half (periods 7-12) are the main interests of this 
study.  
Figure 1.1: Stake Patterns of the Treatments in the First Stage 
 
       Our experimental results show that the gradualism treatment attains significantly more 
successful coordination at a high level of stake. In our laboratory experiment, subjects in the 
“Gradualism” treatment are more likely to contribute in the final high-stake periods than the 
other two main treatments. In terms of magnitude, the effects are quite large – for example, 
in the end period, 61.1% of the “Gradualism” groups successfully coordinate, while only 
16.7% and 33.3% of “Big Bang” and “Semi-gradualism” groups do, respectively. To 
establish a successful coordination at a high level, it is better to start at a low level and as 
importantly, to increase the level slowly.  6 
 
       Our  experimental  results  also  suggest an externality of coordination building (or 
collapse) across different social groups. Those treated in the gradualism setting are about 10 
percentage points more likely to cooperate upon entering a new group. However, when they 
find their cooperation does not get rewarded in a new environment (because the new group 
members may have been treated differently and have different coordination outcomes in the 
first stage), they tend to become less cooperative.  
        To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  ours  is the first study that clearly tests the role of 
exogenous gradualism in coordination within a given group. It also contributes to the 
literature on how cooperation evolves over time with varying levels of stakes in multi-period 
experiments. Our findings point to a simple, voluntary mechanism to promote coordination 
when the capacity to impose sanctions is limited. It is noteworthy that our game is different 
from other games with a gradual (or more generally, dynamic) structure. Detailed 
comparison to the literature can be found in Section 1.2. 
        The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we discuss the related 
literature. In Section 1.3, we detail the experimental design. In Section 1.4, we present the 
major results. Section 1.5 concludes. 
 
1.2.  Literature  
        To better understand this study and its contributions, below we compare it with the 
theoretical and experimental literature about “gradualism” or dynamics in coordination 
games, prisoners’ dilemma games, and public goods games.
10  
                                                 
10 Gradualism is also studied in sequential-move games like trust (investment) games. Pitchford and 
Snyder (2004) develop a model where the sequence of gradually smaller investments solves the 
holdup problem when the buyer’s ability to hold up a seller’s investment is severe. However, 7 
 
        In a laboratory dynamic weakest-link coordination experiment, Weber (2006) studies 
the dynamics of organizational growth and finds that gradually growing the group size leads 
to more successful coordination in a large group versus starting with a large group. This 
study differs from Weber (2006) in three major ways: (1) we explore gradualism in 
coordination within a given fixed-size group; (2) in this study, the choice set in each period 
is binary, and the payoff structure is much simpler; (3) we have a third main treatment 
“Semi-gradualism,” which explores whether a sudden increase of stake harms coordination. 
        Romero (2011) studies the effect of path dependence on weakest-link coordination and 
finds that groups coordinate better with a certain cost when the cost is increasing than when 
the cost is decreasing to that level. This study differs from his in two ways: (1) we change 
the stake level, which indicates not only the cost but also the benefit; (2) we compare slow 
increasing of the stake with sudden increase and with starting at a high stake, while he 
compares an increasing path of the cost with a decreasing one. 
        The gradualism approach in this study is different from those in previous studies on 
dynamic real-time public goods provision by Dorsey (1992), Marx and Matthews (2000), 
Kurzban et al. (2001) and Duffy et al. (2007). Besides the binary weakest-link structure that 
differs from theirs, another feature of this study is that the “public projects” in each period 
are independent from each other (i.e., contributions cannot accumulate over periods) and 
each project has a target (stake) for itself; in their studies on dynamic voluntary contribution 
to a single public project, players are allowed to contribute whenever and as much as they 
wish and accumulate their contributions over the course of the project (there is no objective 
for each period before the end.) This study answers whether a group should work on smaller 
                                                                                                                                                      
Kurzban et al. (2008) contradict this prediction by showing that subjects prefer starting with smaller 
levels of investment and increasing it, rather than the other way around.  
 8 
 
tasks before accomplishing a large collective task, rather than whether a call for large 
collective contributions should be divided into multiple periods to allow accumulations over 
time. Although their studies fit many real world examples such as long-course fund drives, 
this study matches other important cases mentioned in the introduction: in these examples, 
the duration of the final high-stake project is relatively short and cannot divide into sub-
periods to accumulate efforts, and there is no frequent feedback about others’ contributions 
to the final project; instead, beside the final high objective, in each period there is an 
independent project with a clear smaller objective, and after each period players evaluate 
how they perform on these small tasks. 
        Our results show more clearly the efficiency gains of gradualism than the study by 
Andreoni and Samuelson (2006). They examine a twice-played prisoners’ dilemma in which 
the total stakes in two periods are fixed, while the distribution of these stakes across periods 
can be varied. Both their theoretical and experimental results show that it is best to “start 
small,” reserving most of the stakes for the second period. However, in their experiment 
cooperation is low for the period with a high stake,
11 which shows their gradualism setting 
actually does not largely help improve cooperation at a high stake and cannot serve as an 
effective tool to build cooperation.
12 Of course, the clearer effect of gradualism in our study 
may be due to the weakest-link structure which does not allow free riding.  
                                                 
11  When the relative stake of period 2 is high, there is more cooperation in period 1 but less 
cooperation in period 2; when the relative stake of period 2 is low, there is less cooperation in period 
1 but more cooperation in period 2. 
 
12 One example (and motivation) in their study is as follows: “An employer forming a new team of 
workers may give them small initial tasks, to help build cooperation, followed by larger tasks that 
can take advantage of that cooperation.” According to their results, actually the workers are very 
unlikely to reach successful cooperation for larger tasks. 9 
 
        Offerman and van der Veen (2010) study whether governmental subsidies to promote 
public good provision should be abruptly introduced or gradually increased, i.e., given the 
benefit of the public good, whether the individual cost of providing the public good should 
be decreased sharply or gradually. Their result favors an immediate increase of subsidy: 
when the final subsidy level is substantial, the effect of a quick increase is much stronger 
than that of a gradual increase. This study differs from theirs in the following important 
ways. First, their motivation is about how to use subsidies to stimulate cooperation after 
cooperation failures at the beginning. The mechanism in this chapter does not use 
governmental subsidies to promote cooperative behavior; instead it uses a low stake to 
facilitate earlier coordination and a gradual increasing stake path to try to sustain 
coordination at higher levels. Second, in this study, what may change is the stake level, 
which indicates both the cost and the benefit of the public good (in their study, only cost 
changes.) Third, stake paths in this study are non-decreasing, while their cost paths are non-
increasing. 
        There are some studies on monotone games, multi-period games in which players are 
constrained to choose strategies that are non-decreasing over time, i.e., to increase 
contributions over time (e.g., Gale, 1995, 2001; Lockwood & Thomas, 2002; Choi et al., 
2008). In contrast to these studies, this study employs another setting – forcing the stake 
instead of the contribution to be non-decreasing – to better match the aforementioned 
motivation examples.  
        In two theoretical papers, Watson (1999, 2002) shows “starting small and increasing 
interactions over time” is an equilibrium for dynamic cooperation. This study mainly adopts 
an empirical method and focuses on weakest-link coordination problems with no chance for 10 
 
free riding. By determining the stake path exogenously, it answers whether gradualism 
works better, rather than whether players use a gradualism approach.  
        
1.3.  Experimental Design 
        Our experiment is a minimum-effort coordination game with a much simpler payoff 
structure than the standard coordination games in the literature. Specifically, it is a multi-
period stag hunt game due to the binary-choice feature in each period. 
 
1.3.1. Sample and Payoff Structure 
        The laboratory experiment was conducted at Renmin University of China in Beijing, 
China in July 2010 with 256 subjects recruited via the Bulletin Board System (BBS) and 
posters at the university. Most subjects were students from this university and universities 
nearby, and people living nearby. Table 1.1 contains basic summary characteristics of the 
subject pool. The subjects are generally young with an average age around 22, since 91% of 
them are college or graduate students. 41% are male. 12% are (or were) majored in 
economics, 16% in other social sciences, 27% in business, and the remaining in other 
disciplines. The average individual annual income in the year of 2009 falls between 5,000 
yuan and 10,000 yuan.  11 
 
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics of Subjects’ Survey Information 
 
Variable  Mean and  standard deviation  Observations 
Age 22.05  (3.25)  255 
Male 0.41  (0.49)  255 
Income 1.32  (1.38)  255 
Family Income  5.63 (2.69)  189 
Family Economic Status  2.60 (0.74)  254 
Risk Aversion Index  4.47 (1.80)  250 
Han nationality  0.91 (0.29)  255 
Student 0.91  (0.29)  255 
Concentration:    
Economics 0.12 (0.33) 241 
Other Social Sciences  0.16 (0.37)  241 
Business 0.27  (0.45)  241 
Humanity 0.12  (0.33)  241 
Science 0.15  (0.35)  241 
Engineering 0.17 (0.38) 241 
Medical/Health 0.01  (0.09)  241 
Note: Income is a scale variable from 0 to 13, with higher value indicating higher 
income (0: no income; 1: annual income<5000 yuan; 13: annual income>160,000 
yuan). Family income is a scale variable from 1 to 12, with a higher value 
indicating a higher income (1: annual income<5000 yuan; 12: annual 
income>200,000 yuan). Family economic status is coded in the following way: 1 
(lower), 2 (lower middle), 3 (middle), 4 (upper middle), 5 (upper). Risk 
aversion index is a scale from 0 to 10, with a higher value approximately 
indicating higher risk aversion, and is measured as the number of lottery A chosen 
by the subject in our questionnaire. 
 
        There were 18 sessions. All sessions were computerized using the z-Tree experiment 
software package (Fischbacher, 2007). Both the instructions and the information shown on 
the computer screen were in Chinese. In each session, we randomly assigned subjects to 
groups of four,
13 so our sample consisted of 64 groups in total.  The experiment included 
two stages: the first stage comprised twelve periods, while the second one had eight periods. 
In each period, we endowed subjects with 20 points and asked them to give a certain number 
of points to their assigned groups’ common pools. The required number could vary across 
                                                 
13 For coordination games, four is considered as a small or moderate group size. For public goods 
games, Croson and Marks (2000) show in a meta-analysis study that the most frequently used group 
sizes are four, five, and seven.  
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periods, and each subject could only choose either “not to give” (we use the natural term 
“give” rather than “contribute” in the instruction) or “to give the exact points required,” 
which we refer to as stake. If all members in a group gave, then each member not only got 
the points she had given back, but also gained an extra return which equaled the required 
number of points (i.e., the stake). If not all group members contributed, then each member 
finished each period only with her points remaining, and the points she gave out were 
wasted.  
        In sum, the following formula describes individual earnings in each period: 
, , 
,,  
  , , 
20 ,          ,
20,            
20 ,       ,  . . 
ti t j t
it i t
ti t j t
Th if A C and A C j i
Earning if A D
Th if A C and j i st A D
   

 
     
 
        Where  , it Earning  is i ’s earning in period t ,  t Th   is stake at t .  ,  it A  and ,  jt A  are  the 
actions of i  and  j  at  t , respectively ( i  and  j   are in the same group.) C  represents 
“cooperate” (“give”), while D represents “deviate” (“not give”).   
        The final payment is the total earning accumulated over periods plus a show-up fee, 
and the exchange rate is 40 points per yuan.
14 An average subject earns 21~22 yuan (around 
three dollars) including the show-up fee from the whole experiment, which affords ordinary 
meals for one to two days on campus. Regarding the purchasing power, this payment is 
comparable to those experiments conducted in other countries.  
 
1.3.2.    Treatment Group Assignments  
                                                 
14 The yuan/USD exchange rate was about 6.7. 13 
 
        Our experiment consisted of three main treatments: “Big Bang,” “Semi-gradualism” 
and “Gradualism.” All groups in the three main treatments faced the same stake in the 
second half (periods 7-12) of the first stage, but the stake paths for them differed in the first 
half (periods 1-6), which may have imposed an income effect in the laboratory. To estimate 
how much of the difference in performance among the three main treatments in the second 
half of the first stage is driven by an income effect, we introduced a variant of the “Big 
Bang” treatment, namely the “High Show-up Fee” treatment, which we describe in more 
details below.
15 In eight of the 18 sessions, 12 subjects were randomly assigned into the 
three main treatments; in the remaining 10 sessions, 16 subjects were randomly assigned 
into the four treatments (three main treatments and one supplementary treatment). In total, 
we have 18, 18, 18 and 10 groups in “Big Bang,” “Semi-gradualism,” “Gradualism,” and 
“High Show-up Fee” treatments, respectively.               
                Table 1.2 checks how randomization worked in assigning subjects into different 
treatments. The default category is the “Gradualism” treatment and the regressions do not 
have other control variables, so the constant term indicates the mean values of dependent 
variables for the “Gradualism” treatment. There are no significant differences in subjects’ 
characteristics across treatments, except that subjects in the “Semi-gradualism” treatment 
have higher self-reported family economic status, that those in the “Big Bang” and “High 
Show-up Fee” treatments have higher risk aversion indexes, and that those in the “Big 
Bang” treatment are more likely to be students. This shows that randomization did very 
well. 
                                                 
15 The experimental literature often adopts a random period for payment to address the concern of 
income effect. We did not follow this design due to the concern that it may make some subjects less 
serious at playing in each period, and we also want to capture how big the income effect is.  14 
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        In the first stage, the stakes over 12 periods are shown in Figure 1.1: for the “Big Bang” 
treatment, the stakes are always at the highest level,  which is 14 for 16 sessions and 12 for 
two sessions;
16 for the “Semi-gradualism” treatment, they are two for the first six periods 
and set at the highest stake for the next six periods; for the “Gradualism” treatment, they 
increase from two to 12 with a step of two for the first six periods and fix at the highest 
stake for the next six periods. (Revisit Figure 1.1 for a graphical illustration.) The show-up 
fees for these three treatments are 400 points for each individual. The “High Show-up Fee” 
treatment is the same with the “Big Bang” treatment, except that the show-up fee is 480 
instead of 400 points. The extra 80 points are sufficient to capture potential earning 
differences accumulated from periods 1-6 and thus to isolate the effect generated by an 
income effect by comparing the “High Show-up Fee” to the “Big Bang” treatment (we 
discuss this in detail in Section 1.4.)  
        When subjects enter the second stage of the game, they are randomly reshuffled into 
groups of four. New group members may not necessarily come from the same treatment in 
the first stage; this rule is made common knowledge. Within the second stage, group 
compositions are fixed, and stakes are all set at the highest stake for all periods and all 
groups, i.e., those treated in different treatments in the first stage face the same stake in each 
period of the second stage.  
        The information structure is as follows.  
        Subjects know that there are two stages, but not the exact number of periods in each 
stage. Instead, they are told that the experiment will last between 30 minutes and one hour, 
including the time for signing up, reading of instructions, a quiz designed to make sure that 
                                                 
16 We calibrated the highest stake level using 12 and 14, and finally decided to choose 14 in most 
sessions. To make full use of the samples, in the following analysis we pool all 18 sessions together.  
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they understand the experimental rule, and final payment. We chose this design for two 
reasons. First, it is to reduce the possibility of backward induction in theory
17 and a potential 
end-of-game effect.
18 Second, in many cases of the real world, people do not know the exact 
number of coordination opportunities (e.g., how many times they will meet each other, how 
many projects they will have).  
        At the beginning of each period they know the stake of the current period but not those 
of future periods. In many cases of the real world, the levels of future interactions are 
unknown ex ante. 
        At the end of each period they know whether all four group members (including 
herself) gave the required points of that period, but not the total number of group members 
who gave (if fewer than four members gave). This is consistent with the literature of 
minimum-effort coordination games (e.g., Van Huyck et al., 1990), in which the only 
common historical data available to players is the minimum.
19 This setting is also popular in 
the literature of contract theory, in which imperfect observation of efforts is common.  By 
adopting this design we can also increase the difficulty of coordination given other aspects 
of the experiment. 
                                                 
17 Although the number of periods is unknown in our experiment, it is finite. So theoretically players 
can still conduct backward induction to some extent. However, backward induction is not well 
supported empirically in the literature. 
 
18 In minimum-effort coordination games the end-of-game effect should be absent or minor since there is no 
incentive to free ride given that others cooperate. 
 
19 In our setting, if all members cooperate, then the minimum is the stake (or coded in a binary way, 
“1”); otherwise the minimum is zero.   
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        Communication across players is not allowed. We chose this design for two reasons. 
First, communication is often impossible or ineffective in the real world. Second, this design 
makes coordination more difficult.
20   
        At the start of the second stage, each player is notified that they enter a new random 
group. At the end of each stage, each player is told how many points she has accumulated to 
date. 
        At the end of the experiment, we asked subjects to complete a brief survey.  The survey 
collected information on age, gender, nationality, education level, concentration at school, 
working status and income, in addition to eliciting risk preferences over lotteries (see 
Appendix A.2).  
 
1.4.  Results 
In this section we present our findings in summary tables, figures and regressions.  We 
analyze the effect of treatments on the following three outcome variables per period: 
whether a group coordinates successfully, whether an individual contributes, and the 
individual’s earning.  
        Table 1.3 contains the summary of designs and performances of all four treatments in 
the first stage. Clearly, the “Gradualism” treatment has better performances of coordination 
for periods 7-12 in the first stage, which shows that gradualism does promote coordination at 
a high stake level. For example, in period 7, 66.7% of “Gradualism” groups have 
coordinated successfully, while the success rates of “Big Bang,” “Semi-gradualism,” and 
                                                 
20 Ostrom (2010) summarizes that communication improves cooperation. Charness (2000) shows that 
communication helps coordination in small groups, while Weber et al. (2001) and Chaudhuri et al. 
(2009) find that large group coordination is still difficult even with communication.  18 
 
“High Show-up Fee” groups are only 16.7%, 33.3% and 30%, respectively. Similar results 
can be found in period 12.  
 Table 1.3: Summary of Treatments in the First Stage 
Treatment Big  Bang  Semi-
gradualism  Gradualism  High Show-up 
Fee 
Endowment in each period  20  20  20  20 
Show up Fee (points)  400  400  400  480 
Exchange Rate (points/yuan) 40  40  40  40 
Stake in period  1  14*  2  2  14* 
Stake in period  6  14*  2  12  14* 
Stake in period  7-12  14*  14*  14*  14* 
Number of groups  18  18  18  10 
Number of subjects  72  72  72  40 
Number of groups 
successful in period  1  3 13 13  3 
Number of groups 
successful in period  7  3 6 12  3 
Number of groups 
successful in period  12  3 6 11  3 
Percent  of groups successful 
in period  1  16.7% 72.2% 72.2%  30% 
Percent  of groups successful 
in period  7  16.7% 33.3% 66.7%  30% 
Percent  of groups successful 
in period  12  16.7% 33.3% 61.1%  30% 
Average earning up to Period 6 
(show-up fee not included)  112.42 126.31 143.94  127.35 
Median earning up to Period 6 
(show-up fee not included)  106 130 162  106 
 *: In two sessions, it is 12 rather than 14. 
 
        To check the concern that the different performances for periods 7-12 may be due to an 
income effect (i.e., those treated in the “Gradualism” treatment may earn more in periods 1-
6, so they are more likely to contribute in periods 7-12), Table 1.3 also provides summaries 
of individual earning up to period 6 (i.e., earning accumulated from period 1 to 6, not 
including the show-up fee) for each treatment. On average, subjects in the “Gradualism” 
treatment do have the highest earning from the first six periods: the average (median) 
earning by period 6 is 112.42 (106) for the “Big Bang” treatment, 126.31 (130) for the 19 
 
“Semi-gradualism” treatment, and 143.94 (162) for the “Gradualism” treatment. But the 
differences in means (and medians) are much smaller than 80 points, the difference of show-
up fee between the “High Show-up Fee” treatment and the other three treatments. This 
shows that a show-up fee difference of 80 points between the “Big Bang” and “High Show-
up Fee” treatments is large enough to capture the potential income differences at the start of 
period 7 between “Big Bang,” “Semi-gradualism,” and “Gradualism” treatments. Actually, 
if we add up the show-up fee, subjects in the “Gradualism” treatment earn less than those in 
the “High Show-up Fee” treatment on average by period 6. So since we still find the 
“Gradualism” treatment has better performance than the “High Show-up Fee” treatment in 
periods 7-12 in stage 1, the difference should not be driven by a potential income effect from 
the first six periods.
21  
                 
        Result 1: The success rate in period 1 is higher for groups with a lower stake.   
        In period 1, over two third of “Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism” groups coordinate 
successfully at the low stake, while only three out of 18 (or 10) of the “Big Bang” (or “High 
Show-up Fee”) groups are successful at the high stake.  
         
        Result 2: For groups that have attained successful coordination at t with the same 
stake, the success rate at t+1 is higher for those with a lower increase of stake at t+1.   
                This pattern can be seen in Table 1.3 and Figure 1.2. A large gap between 
“Gradualism” and “Semi-gradualism” treatments emerges in period 7 when the stake jumps 
from two to 14 for the “Semi-gradualism” treatment. Both treatments have high success 
                                                 
21 Real world income may also affect individuals’ decisions. By randomly assigning subjects into 
various treatments, we rule out the possibility that the differences of performance are due to real 
world income. 20 
 
rates of approximately 70% for the first six periods. But the success rate of the “Semi-
gradualism” treatment decreases sharply to only 33.3% from period 7, while that of the 
“Gradualism” treatment remains at a high level of above 60%. The “High Show-up Fee” 
treatment has a success rate of 30% for all 12 periods, and about 16.7% of “Big Bang” 
groups succeed for almost all periods.  
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  A group is successful if all four members give the required amount (stake) in that period. 
Figure 1.2: Success Rates of Groups by Treatment and Period in the First Stage 
              
        Result 3: Conditional on failed coordination at t, most groups fail with the same or 
a higher stake at t+1.   
        In Figure 3.1 we examine how coordination results vary across periods for each group 
by each treatment. For each group, the horizontal axis indicates the period, and the vertical 
axis indicates the coordination result (success or failure): a bar with value one indicates 21 
 
successful coordination, while that with value zero indicates failed coordination. Each group 
is identified by a code in the following way: the lowest digit indicates the treatment type 
(1=“Big Bang,” 2=“Semi-gradualism,” 3=“Gradualism,” 4=“High Show-up Fee”); the 
highest one or two digits indicate the session number (1-18).  
        Figure 1.3 clearly shows that once a group has failed in coordination, it almost never 
becomes successful subsequently. There are only five exceptions (one “Big Bang” group 
and four “Semi-gradualism” groups) out of 64 groups. This finding is consistent with Weber 
et al. (2001) and Weber (2006), in which they find once groups have reached an inefficient 
outcome, they are unable subsequently to reach a more efficient outcome.
22  
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A: “Big Bang” Groups 
Figure 1.3: All Group Coordination Results for Each Treatment  
 
                                                 
22   However, changing incentives can improve coordination (Berninghaus & Ehrhart, 1998; 
Bornstein, Gneezy & Nagel, 2002; Brandts & Cooper, 2006b). 22 
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B: “Semi-gradualism” Groups 
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C: “Gradualism” Groups 
 
Figure 1.3 (Continued)  23 
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D: “High Show-up Fee” Groups 
 
Figure 1.3 (Continued)  
 
        Result 4: Conditional on successful coordination at t, most groups succeed with the 
same stake at t+1.   
        Similarly, once a group has succeeded, it almost always remains successful with the 
same stake. Figure 1.3 shows that there are only seven exceptions (one “Big Bang” group, 
four “Semi-gradualism” groups, and two “Gradualism” groups). Conditional on successful 
coordination in period 1, “Big Bang,” “Gradualism” and “High Show-up Fee” groups are 
almost all successful in following periods; but since the “Big Bang” and “High Show-up 
Fee” treatments have a much lower success rate in period 1 than the “Gradualism” 
treatment, on average they perform much worse than the “Gradualism” treatment at a high 
stake.   24 
 
        Figure 1.4 shows the fractions of individuals contributing over periods in the first stage 
for the four treatments. “Big Bang” and “High Show-up Fee” treatments start with average 
contribution rates above 60%, but decrease quickly over the initial periods and end at about 
20% and 40%, respectively. “Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism” treatments start with a 
high average contribution rate above 90%, decrease slightly over the first 6 periods to a rate 
of about 80%. However, the contribution rate decreases sharply from period 6 to 7 for the 
“Semi-gradualism” treatment (when stake is sharply raised from two to 14), while that for 
the “Gradualism” treatment remains high. Although the contribution rates of all treatments 
generally decrease over time (even for the “Gradualism” treatment), the results are 
consistent with Figures 1.2 and 1.3: except for several exceptions and for “Semi-
gradualism” groups (from period 6 to 7), the decrease of contribution rates is almost all 
caused by those who give up cooperating when their cooperative actions at previous periods 
have not been rewarded because of coordination failure, while those have succeeded keep 
cooperating. The differences among the four treatments in Figure 1.2 (regarding group 
success rate) is much more stark than those in Figure 1.4 (regarding fractions of individuals 
contributing), since you need all four members to give at the same time to make the group 
coordination successful, which is much more difficult than asking only one person to give. 
This is why coordinating at the same pace is so important, and gradualism helps address this 
challenge significantly.  25 
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Figure 1.4: Contribution Rate by Treatment and Period in the First Stage 
 
        Figure 1.5 shows the average individual earning in each period. The results also show 
that the “Gradualism” treatment works best through the perspective of social welfare.  
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Figure 1.5: Average Individual Earning by Treatment and Period in the First Stage 26 
 
        Table 1.4 shows the formal regression results for periods 7-12 in the first stage, when 
all treatment groups face the same high stake. The default category is the “Gradualism” 
treatment and the regressions do not have other control variables, so the constant terms 
indicate the mean values of dependent variables for the “Gradualism” treatment. Dependent 
variables are a dummy indicating whether an individual gives or not in periods 7 and 12 (in 
Column 1 and 2, respectively), an individual’s earning in periods 7 and 12 (in Column 3 and 
4), and a dummy indicating whether the group has successful coordination: we consider 
period 7 in Column 5, period 12 in Column 6, and since this dummy is our main variable of 
interest, we further examine all six periods from period 7 to 12 in Column 7. All standard 
errors are clustered at the appropriate level. It shows that the differences between the 
“Gradualism” treatment and other treatments are mostly large and significant. F-test 
(unreported) shows that the differences between “Big Bang” and “High Show-up Fee” 
treatments are statistically insignificant, although it might be due to a relatively small 
sample. Moreover, the large and significant differences between “Gradualism” and “High 
Show-up Fee” treatments suggest that the advantage of gradualism is not driven by the 
income effect in the laboratory. We also employ probit and logit specifications (unreported) 
when the dependent variable is whether an individual contributes or whether a group reaches 
successful coordination, and the results are very similar with those OLS results in Table 1.4 
(Columns (1), (2), and (5)-(7)). When the dependent variables are contribution and earning, 
which are at the individual level, additional regressions (unreported) with survey controls 
show very similar results with those in Columns (1)-(4).
23  
                                                 
23 There may be a concern that economics and business students play differently with other students. 
We address this concern by examining actions in the first period, as well as actions in the second 
period conditional on the coordination outcome of the first period, and find no differences between 
economics/business students and other students.   27 
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       Result 5: Those treated in the “Gradualism” treatment in stage 1 are more likely to 
contribute upon entering a new group in stage 2. But this difference quickly 
disappears.   
        In  Table  1.5  we  examine  whether  the treatments in the first stage have effects on 
behaviors and outcomes in the second stage when subjects enter a new group. Note that 
everyone knows that the new group members may have been exposed to other stake paths in 
the first stage. Since the group compositions are different from those in the first stage, we 
only look at individuals’ contribution and earning in each period of the second stage, rather 
than the group-level coordination results. Interestingly, those in the “Gradualism” treatment 
in the first stage are more likely to contribute in the first period of the second stage. It is 
important to keep in mind that group assignment in stage 2 is a new randomization, and 
subjects know that they are playing in a new group. Thus, this finding is indicative of a new 
effect, namely an inter-stage effect of having been treated in a gradualism environment, 
which is similar with the inter-stage effect in trust games found by Bohnet and Huck 
(2004).
24 However, this effect disappears over the course of the second stage, suggesting a 
learning process where the behaviors of the different treatment groups converge as they 
observe the play of their new group members. For example, those in the “Gradualism” 
treatment find their new group members are not as cooperative as those in the first stage, 
thus becoming less willing to contribute in following periods.  
        These findings suggest that the gradualism setting can induce a long-run cooperative 
behavior, most likely through a history of successful coordination and an increased level of 
                                                 
24 They study a trust game and find that trustees are more trustworthy in the stranger environment in 
the second stage after having been exposed to a partner in the first stage. 
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trust.
25 However, when they find their trust does not get rewards in a new environment, they 
tend to become less cooperative. This shows an externality of coordination building (or 
collapse) across different social groups.  
 
Table 1.5: Contribution and Earning in Each Period of the second Stage by Treatment 
  Period 1  Period 2    Whole Stage 
 Contribution Earning  Contribution Earning   Contribution Earning 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4)    (5) (6) 
BIG BANG  -0.125*  1.639  0.000  0.389    0.002  0.514 
 (0.069)  (1.764)  (0.073)  (1.524)   (0.052)  (1.143) 
SEMI-GRADUALISM -0.097  3.111  0.000  1.833   0.066  1.240 
 (0.072)  (1.890)  (0.091)  (1.500)   (0.066)  (1.297) 
HIGH SHOWUP FEE -0.161*  -1.467 0.053 -5.100**   -0.096  -2.447
 (0.089)  (2.438)  (0.091)  (2.230)   (0.071)  (1.541) 
Constant  0.861*** 18.17*** 0.597*** 21.75***  0.505*** 22.47***
 (0.047)  (1.895)  (0.064)  (1.493)   (0.058)  (1.195) 
Observations 256  256  256  256    2,048  2,048 
R-squared 0.020  0.018  0.002  0.044    0.011  0.016 
Note: The default treatment is “Gradualism.” Robust standard errors in parentheses. Standard errors are 
all clustered at group level. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Individual 
contribution is a binary variable. 
 
1.5.  Conclusion and Discussion 
        The findings in this chapter suggest that gradualism -- defined as increasing step-by-
step the stake level required for coordination -- can serve as a powerful mechanism for 
achieving socially optimal outcomes in coordination. In a laboratory setting, gradualism 
significantly outperforms alternative paths to coordinated behavior, which shows that 
starting at a low level and growing slowly are both important for later coordination at a 
substantial level. We also find an externality of coordination building (or collapse) across 
different social groups. Those treated in the gradualism setting are more likely to cooperate 
                                                 
25 It is possible that those in the “Gradualism” treatment contribute significantly more in first period 
of the second stage just because of a wealth effect coming from their higher average earning from the 
preceding stage. Under the assumption of decreasing absolute risk aversion, this greater wealth could 
produce a greater willingness to contribute. While possible, we do believe that any income effect 
would be small, certainly not enough to generate the observed discrepancy.   30 
 
upon entering a new environment than those treated differently. However, when they find 
their cooperation does not get rewards in a new environment, they tend to become less 
cooperative as well. 
        In this experiment we focus on certain settings of gradualism. There are many ways to 
extend this study in the future. Allowing communication, adopting a non-weakest-link 
payoff structure (e.g., allowing free riding), changing the group size and the highest stake 
level, adopting a different information structure and a more complex dynamic path of stakes, 
are all important dimensions for future study. It will be also interesting to examine whether 
gradualism helps rebuild coordination after it collapses, and whether an end-of-game effect 
exists and affects the role of gradualism in coordination.  
        Compared to the existing literature on coordination games, this chapter also suggests a 
case where limiting choices can improve social welfare. The literature on coordination 
games generally uses a complex payoff structure in which each individual has as many as 
seven choices for actions in each period (e.g., Van Huyck et al., 1990; Knez & Camerer, 
1994, 2000; Cachon & Camerer 1996; Weber, 2006; Chaudhuri et al., 2009). For those with 
higher willingness to give in the first period, once they observe their high-cooperative 
actions are harmed by low-cooperative actions of their partners, they reduce the level of 
cooperation. After just several periods, an inefficient outcome is attained rather than a high 
efficient outcome, and the groups are then trapped in this low equilibrium. In contrast, in our 
experiment the subjects are restricted to two choices in each period: giving a specified 
amount or not giving. A gradualism institution, which increases the specified amount 
gradually, maintains subjects’ high willingness to give even when the specified amount 
becomes substantial. As suggested in this study, limiting choices in each period (but without 31 
 
mandatory or semi-mandatory institutions, e.g., sanction and social pressure), plus a well-
designed institutional path, may help subjects reach a social optimal outcome.
26 Questions 
about the optimal path to attain a long-run objective of collective optimal deserve future 
studies. 
        To the best of our knowledge, our study is the first one that clearly tests the role of 
exogenous gradualism in coordination within a given group. It adopts an exogenous setting 
of stake path from a normative perspective. The results have important implications for 
future research on real world policies to promote coordination among individuals, 
organizations, regions and countries.  
                                                 
26 In the gradualism treatment of our experiment, we limit the number of choices in each period to 
two (i.e., each one can choose not to give or to give exactly the stake points in each period). Since 
our experiment involves collective interactions and thus a more obvious externality of own action on 
others, it is less surprising that limiting individual choices may be good for social welfare. What is 
more interesting in our findings is that individuals still have the freedom to choose between two 
options in each period (i.e., they are not forced to cooperate), and there is no sanction, punishment, 
and social pressure. 32 
 
2. GRADUALISM, WEAKEST LINK AND INFORMATION: 
THEORY AND COORDINATION EXPERIMENTS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
        This chapter extends Chapter 1 (Ye et al., 2012) and tests the gradualism hypothesis 
under various information and payoff structures. I first provide theoretical predictions, and 
then compare three computer-based laboratory experiments with repeated interactions which 
stylize typical coordination settings in the real world. The detail of the first experiment is 
reported in Chapter 1, while this Chapter focuses on comparisons of the three experiments. 
        As introduced in Chapter 1, in each period of the experiments, subjects are endowed 
with some points (monetary units in the laboratory) and are asked to participate in a group 
project with a stake. They then choose whether to participate or not. If they participate, they 
contribute an amount of points equaling the stake; if not, they contribute zero. The decision 
in each period is binary: to contribute exactly the stake or nothing to the group project, but 
not a third amount. The path of the stake, which may or may not change over periods, is 
determined by the assigned treatment.  
        In the first two experiments, each member realizes an extra return only when all group 
members contribute to the project; otherwise each ends up with only the points that she does 
not give. These first two experiments differ from each other in their information structures. 
The information feedback in the first experiment is limited: after each period subjects are 
only informed whether all group members contribute. On the contrary, that in the second 
one is richer: they are told exactly how many group members contribute.  33 
 
        Coordination and cooperation projects in the real world not always have a weakest-link 
payoff structure: in many cases a project only requires part of the parties to contribute, so 
free riding is possible. To find how gradualism works with a non-weakest-link payoff 
structure, I also conduct a third experiment in which the project in each period can be 
successful as long as at least three (out of four) group members contribute. Other features of 
this experiment are identical to the second weakest-link coordination experiment described 
above.  
        Following  the  first  experiment  (introduced in Chapter 1), each of the other two 
experiments has three main treatments (“Big Bang,” “Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism”) 
of stake patterns. (See Figure 2.1 for a graphical illustration.)  
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Figure 2.1: Stake Patterns of the Treatments 
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        Comparing  the  two  weakest-link  experiments, I find that with limited information, 
individuals coordinate most successfully at the high stake level in the gradualism treatment 
relative to the big-bang approach; with a richer information structure, the advantage of 
gradualism shrinks because a richer information structure facilitates later coordination for 
the big-bang approach when a group is close to success. Finally, I find that when free riding 
is possible, all treatments perform worse and gradualism alone (without perfect monitoring 
and other institutions) does not help. 
        This chapter builds on Chapter 1 and explores the heterogeneous effect of gradualism 
under different information and payoff structures. It also adds to the literature on the impact 
of information structure in coordination, on discrete public good games,
27 and  on  the 
relationship between cooperation and coordination.
28 Detailed comparison to the literature 
on dynamic games can be found in Chapter 1. 
        The  rest  of  the  paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, I present theoretical 
predictions. In Section 2.3, I detail the experimental designs. In Section 2.4, I present the 
major results of the two weakest-link experiments. Section 2.5 further discusses the 
theoretical explanations for weakest-link games. Section 2.6 presents the third experiment 
with the possibility for free riding. Section 2.7 concludes. 
                                                 
27  For example, Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984), Isaac et al. (1989), Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), 
Bagnoli and McKee (1991), and Marks and Croson (1998, 1999). See Ledyard (1995) for an early 
survey. 
 
28 All three experiments in this chapter can be considered as either discrete public good games or 
coordination games, although the first two are generally referred as “coordination games” and the 
third a “discrete public goods game.” The only difference is about the required number of 
contributors (i.e., whether free riding is possible). This study suggests a clear link and the 
performance difference between these two types of games. Knez and Camerer (1994, 2000) discuss 
the relationship between prisoners’ dilemma and coordination games, and notice that organizational 
growth may switch a (weakest-link) coordination problem into a cooperation problem (with a chance 
for free riding).  35 
 
 
2.2  Theoretical Predictions 
2.2.1  A Model of Belief Updating in Weakest-link Coordination 
        Coordination problems involve multiple equilibria, thus belief about others’ actions is a 
most important factor deciding which equilibrium to play in coordination. The starting stake 
level and the stake path can affect belief formation and updating; in addition, information 
and payoff structures shape beliefs directly, thus may affect coordination and the role of 
gradualism. Although the main contribution of this study is on the empirical side, I will first 
present a simple belief-based learning model for weakest-link coordination games to 
theoretically explore the potential role of gradualism in these games; in Section 2.2.2 I 
discuss the case when free riding is possible.  
        The  intuition  of  the  model  is  as  follows. In the belief-based learning framework, 
players have prior beliefs about others’ actions before the game starts, and update their 
beliefs according to the outcome in each period. A low stake at the beginning gives them 
stronger beliefs that others will try to cooperate, and also makes it cheap to attempt 
coordination in the face of uncertainty, so they will cooperate as well given the weakest-link 
payoff structure. Similarly, at each level where they manage to coordinate, they reinforce 
their beliefs about the likelihood that others will cooperate at the same or a slightly higher 
stake. On the contrary, if the stake starts at a high level, they believe that others are less 
likely to cooperate, which leads to initial failure and reduces their beliefs that others will 
cooperate later at the same or a higher stake level, thus undermining future coordination. 
Finally, in the presence of a sudden increase in the stake in two consecutive periods, 
previous coordination at low stakes may not largely affect players’ posteriors on actions at 36 
 
substantially higher stake levels; thus, successful coordination at a low level may not 
guarantee immediate successful coordination at a high level. In addition, information 
feedback is important for belief updating: a richer information structure makes belief 
updating easier, thus may facilitate coordination when (they know) most group members 
cooperate.   
        The main aspects of the model are belief-based learning, level-k thinking, myopia, and 
standard self-interested preferences with risk aversion. These assumptions allow me to focus 
on the belief updating process, a most important feature in coordination. A more general 
learning model of dynamic games is beyond the scope of this chapter.  
        I adopt the myopic assumption for two reasons. First, it is often used in learning models 
(e.g., reinforcement learning, belief-based learning, experience-weighted attention learning, 
adaptive dynamics; see Section 2.5.3 for details). Second, it does not affect the explanatory 
power of this simple model, and allows me to focus on the key process of belief updating. I 
will further discuss this in Section 2.5.1.  
        The setup of the model is as follows. There are N periods. In each period a group of I 
players conduct a binary coordination task: each player can choose to participate (cooperate, 
“C”) or not participate (deviate, “D”). The endowment per person in each period is E. The 
level of the coordination task,  (0 ) tt Th Th  , may vary across periods. So in each period, each 
player can choose to contribute either zero or exactly  t Th , but not other amounts of efforts, 
to the group project. I adopt a minimum-effort (weakest-link) payoff structure: the value of 
the project output for everyone is  t Th   ( 1   ) if all I players contribute  t Th , and zero 
otherwise. So the payoff of player i in period t is as follows:  37 
 
        Players do not know others’ actions when they make decisions. After each period, they 
get some feedback of the coordination result. 
        I adopt level-k thinking in this model: level-0 players are nonstrategic (the specific 
definition of level-0 players may vary across games), while level-1 players best respond to 
level-0 players, and level-2 players best respond to level-1 players; more generally, level-k 
players best respond to level-k-1 players for any  1 k    (e.g., Costa-Gomes et al., 2001; 
Costa-Gomes & Crawford, 2006; Costa-Gomes et al., 2009). In a level-k player’s mind all 
opponents are level-k-1 players: for example, in a level-1 player’s mind all opponents are 
level-0 players; in a level-2 player’s mind all opponents are level-1 players.
29 The literature 
shows that most players are level-1 or level-2 thinking, and the ratio of level-0 players is 
small. So I assume there are only level-0, level-1 or level-2 players. But the theoretical 
results also apply when there are level-k players ( 3 k  ).  
        In this model I assume that a level-0 player has a constant “willingness-to-give,” which 
is the amount of effort she would like to contribute if there is no binary constraint for the 
decision in each period. This assumption is a natural extension from the case of continuous 
play because the continuous “willingness-to-give” can be considered as a “latent action” of 
the discrete binary decision in each period.
30 So if her willingness-to-give is larger than or 
                                                 
29 In cognitive hierarchy models (e.g., Camerer et al., 2003), level-2 players best respond not to level-
1 players alone but to a mixture of level-0 and level-1 players. But this difference will not affect the 
theoretical results (Propositions 2.1-2.3).  
 
30 Interviews with players after experiments confirm that some players do adopt such a rule at least in 
the first period. For example, they say that they will give as long as the stake is below 10 (or 8, 12, 
etc.) points.  
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equal to the stake (then I call her a “high type”), she will give; otherwise she will not give 
(then I call her a “low type”). Note that since the stake may change, the type only applies for 
a certain period: a high type for a certain stake may not be a high type for a higher stake; 
vice versa. I further introduce a noise on level-0 players’ actions: a high type has a 
probability of   ( 01  ) that she does not contribute (due to “mistakes”),
31 and  a 
probability of 1    that she contributes; a low type has a probability of  (01   ) that she 
contributes (due to “mistakes”), and a probability of 1    that she does not contribute. It is 
natural to assume 1     , i.e., the high type is more likely to contribute than the low type. 
Level-1 players know (or believe) this decision rule of level-0 players; level-2 players know 
that level-1 players know this rule, etc.                   
        A level-1 player has a prior belief about each level-0 player’s “willingness-to-give,” an 
unknown constant for her, chooses the best response according to her belief, and updates her 
belief according to the outcome and feedback of each period. Similarly, a level-2 player has 
a prior belief about level-1 players’ actions, chooses the best response according to her 
belief, and updates her belief after each period.            
        Suppose all I players are risk averse. A level-1 player i’s belief about a level-0 player 
j’s willingness-to-give is 
i
j B , which follows a cumulative distribution function  , ()
i
jt F ,  ji  .  
        A level-1 or level-2 player (or any level-k player for  1 k  ) i will contribute in period t 
if and only if she believes the probability that all her opponents (in a level-1 player’s mind 
all opponents are level-0 players; in a level-2 player’s mind all opponents are level-1 
                                                 
31 This setup is similar to the study by Fudenburg et al. (2011) on the experimental play of repeated 
prisoners’ dilemma when intended actions are implemented with exogenous noises. But in this 
model only level-0 players may make mistakes, and level-1 players believe her opponents (in their 
minds all opponents are level-0 players) may make mistakes. As in their study, by believing that 
others may make mistakes, some cooperative players play “leniently”: they may not retaliate for the 
first defection of others. 39 
 
players) will contribute exceeds a certain value  () it Th  , which denotes her risk attitude. I 
call  () it Th  the “reserved probability of success.” Under the assumption of risk aversion 
( '( ) 0, ''( ) 0 Ux Ux  ), it is easy to have the following lemma: 
 
Lemma 2.1. The reserved probability of success is between 0 and 1; the higher the stake, the 
higher the reserved probability of success (0( ) 1 it Th    , and  () / 0 it t Th Th    ). 
Proof: See Appendix A.3.  
 
        The intuition of Lemma 2.1 is simple: the higher the stake, the higher the “reserved 
probability of success” which makes a risk-averse “rational” player (e.g., a level-1 or level-2 
player, but not level-0 players) willing to have a try.     
        Under  the  assumption  of  independent  distributions  on  i’s belief about all her 
opponents’ types, a level-1 player i will contribute at t if and only if: 
  ,, [(1 ) (1 )] ( )
ii
j tj t i t
ji
s sT h  

                     (2.1) 
         
        Where  ,, Pr ( ) 1 ( )
ii i
jt j t jt t so b B T hF T h     is i’s belief regarding the probability that a 
level-0 player j is a high type in period t. 
 
Proposition 2.1. The lower the  1 Th , the higher the probability that the coordination at t=1 
will succeed.  
Proof: See Appendix A.4. 40 
 
 
                Proposition 2.1 suggests that coordination will be more likely to succeed at the 
beginning with a lower stake level.  
        Next, I show the manner in which a level-1 player i updates her belief.  
        After t, if i observes her opponent j (in i’s mind, j is a level-0 player) does not give at t 
(with the information structure of both weakest-link experiments in this study and other 
coordination experiments, i may not necessarily observe the actions of j after each period), 
then according to the Bayes’ rule, her posterior belief about the probability that  j  is a high 
type is:   
,, , , , Pr ( | )/ [ ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ]
ii i i i
jt j t jt jt jt jt ho b B T h A D s s s          
        So  at  t+1,  if the stake is still  t Th ,  then  i  believes that the probability that j will 
contribute is  ,, (1 ) (1 )
ii
jt jt hh     . 
        If i observes j gives at t, then her posterior belief about the probability that j is a high 
type is:    
,, , , , Pr ( | )( 1 ) / [ ( 1 ) ( 1 ) ]
ii i i i
jt j t jt jt jt jt ko b B T h A C s s s          
        So  at  t+1,  if the stake is still  t Th ,  then  i  believes that the probability that j will 
contribute is  ,, (1 ) (1 )
ii
jt jt kk     . 
        It is easy to show that  ,,
ii
jt jt kh   and  ,, ,, ( 1 )( 1 ) ( 1 )( 1 )
ii ii
jt jt jt jt kk hh         , given 
1   . The intuition is as follows: if the high type has a higher probability to contribute 
than the low type, then the probability that j is a high type (and the probability that j will 
contribute next period facing the same stake) is larger when j contributes than when j does 
not. 41 
 
        Then, assuming independent distributions of all j’s actions at t+1, i believes that the 
probability that all j will contribute at t+1 with the same stake ( 1 tt Th Th   ) is 
,, ,, {[1 ( ) 1 ( ) ] ( 1 ) }
ii
jt jt jt jt
ji
hA D kAC  

      , where 1( )   equals one if the argument in 
the parenthesis is true, and zero otherwise. Assuming that i observes that the number of 
contributing opponents (in i’s mind all opponents are level-0 players) at t is m 
(01 mI   ), since  ,,
ii
jt jt kh   and 1     , the larger the m, the larger the probability i 
believes that all opponents  will contribute  at  t+1 when  1 tt Th Th   ,  thus the larger the 
probability i will contribute at t+1.  
        Since a level-2 player k knows the rules of decision and belief updating for level-1 
players, the larger the m, the larger the probability k believes that all i will contribute at t+1 
when  1 tt Th Th   , thus the larger the probability k will contribute at t+1.
32 
         For a level-0 player j, no matter how large the m is, the probability that she will give is 
always (1 )1( ) 1( ) jt jt BT h BT h     . 
         So when players are informed about the number (m) of contributors at t with a stake 
t Th , the larger the m, the higher the probability that all level-0, level-1 and level-2 players 
will contribute at t+1 if  1 tt Th Th   , so the higher the probability that the coordination at t+1 
will succeed if  1 tt Th Th   . Thus we have: 
 
                                                 
32 Similarly, a level-3 player knows the strategy rule of level-2 players, so the larger the m, the larger 
the probability that a level-3 player will contribute at t+1, and so on.  42 
 
Proposition 2.2 When players are informed about the number (m) of contributors at t with a 
stake  t Th , the larger the m, the higher the probability that the coordination at t +1 will 
succeed if  1 tt Th Th   . 
Proof: See above. 
 
        Proposition 2.2 shows the importance of information feedback in belief updating. When 
players are informed about the exact number of contributors after each period, they can 
update their beliefs more efficiently. If they know most members have contributed and allow 
a probability that the non-contributor’s real intention is to contribute (i.e., the non-
contributor makes a mistake at playing), then they are more likely to keep contributing at the 
same stake even coordination has failed, thus may become successful later. However, if they 
fail in coordination and do not know most members have contributed, or they know most 
members have not contributed, they are less likely to become successful.  
        Below I show that a slow increase in stake is always no worse than a quick increase for 
coordination.  
 
Proposition 2.3. No matter whether a group succeeds or fails at t with a stake  t Th , the lower 
the  1() tt Th Th   , the (weakly) higher the probability that the coordination at t +1 will 
succeed. 
Proof: See the proof of Proposition 2.1 and replace t=1 with t = t +1.  
 
        In Section 2.5 I further discuss the theoretical explanations.   
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2.2.2  The Case When Free Riding Is Possible 
        Belief is also important in coordination when free riding is possible. A self-interested 
player will contribute if and only if she believes that her contribution will be pivotal, which 
is hard for her to decide.
33 Even the player is conditionally cooperative (Fischbacher et al., 
2001), i.e., she is willing to cooperate if others cooperate as well or if she believes others 
will cooperate, she also needs to have a clear belief about the probability distribution of the 
number of contributors in each period.  
        Although the model in Section 2.2.1 suggests a potential advantage of gradualism in 
weakest-link coordination, it cannot be taken for granted when free riding is possible 
because the belief updating process under this case is less consistent and much more 
difficult. Theoretically, when free riding is possible in the coordination game (or “discrete 
public good game”), there are many pure equilibria in the one-shot game (for example, in 
the third experiment in this study, when three out of four members are required to 
contribute, there are five pure equilibria in the one-shot game), which is much more 
complicated than the binary weakest-link games (in which there are only two pure equilibria 
in the one-shot game: either all contribute, or none contributes). Even a group has succeeded 
in coordination (i.e., at least the required number of members contribute) and even 
gradualism makes coordination easier at the beginning with a low stake, in the next period 
some group members may want to free ride or expect others to free ride, so one’s belief 
about others’ actions may be much less consistent across periods than in the weakest-link 
                                                 
33 More accurately, a self-interested player will contribute if and only if the gain in expected utility 
from contributing is non-negative. Given the payoff matrix in the third experiment (see Section 2.6), 
let P3, P2, P1 and P0 denote i’s belief about the probability that exactly three, two, one and zero other 
group member(s) will contribute, i will contribute if and only if the following long inequality holds:  
23 0 1 [( ) ( ) ] [( 2 ) ( 1 . 2 5 ) ]( ) [( ) ( ) ] it i t i t iit P UET h U E P UE T h UE T h P PUE UET h       . 44 
 
case (in the latter, once all group members contribute, players have a high belief that all 
others will keep contributing at the same stake since deviation cannot bring personal 
benefits.) So it is more difficult for the players to update their beliefs about others’ actions in 
each period, and coordinating on certain outcomes (especially the high-efficiency equilibria 
in which exactly the required number of members contribute, and the non-equilibrium 
outcomes when more than enough members contribute) is difficult: there are supposed to be 
more fluctuations over periods.  
        The above discussion suggests that the role of gradualism is unclear when free riding is 
possible. Thus I adopt an empirical method to answer this question in Section 2.6. 
 
2.3  Experimental Designs 
2.3.1  Sample and Payoff Structure 
        Table  2.1  lists  the  experimental designs of the three experiments. Although I have 
introduced the design of the first experiment in Chapter 1, here I repeat some aspects of the 
design for this chapter to be self-contained. I focus on the two weakest-link coordination 
experiments in this section and discuss the third experiment that allows for free riding in 
Section 2.6.  45 
 
Table 2.1: Experimental Designs 
Experiment Experiment    1 
(weakest-link with 
limited information) 
Experiment 2 
(weakest-link with 
richer information) 
Experiment  3 
(chance for free riding)
 
Location, time and 
No. of subjects 
Renmin University, 
July 2010, 
N=256 
Xiamen University, 
May 2011, 
N=216 
Xiamen University, 
May 2011,  
N=144 
Group size, required 
No.  of contributors 
4, 4  4, 4  4, 3 
Information structure 1. Do not know No. of 
periods 
2. Do not know future 
stakes 
3. Only know whether 
successful or not 
1. Know No. of periods
2. Know future stakes 
3. Know how many 
members contribute  
1. Know No. of periods
2. Know future stakes 
3. Know how many 
members contribute 
Treatments Big  Bang 
Semi-gradualism 
Gradualism 
High Show-up Fee 
Big Bang 
Semi-gradualism 
Gradualism 
Big Bang 
Semi-gradualism 
Gradualism 
Method to eliminate 
income effect 
Introduce the “High 
Show-up Fee” treatment
Randomly pick up one 
period for payment 
(multiplied by the No. 
of periods) 
Randomly pick up one 
period for payment 
(multiplied by the No. 
of periods) 
Conversion rate  1 yuan=40 points  1 yuan=30 points  1 yuan=30 points 
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        Experiment 1 (limited-information weakest-link game), as introduced in Chapter 1, was 
conducted at Renmin University of China in Beijing, China in July 2010 with 256 subjects 
recruited via the Bulletin Board System (BBS) and posters at the university. Experiment 2 
(rich-information weakest-link game) was conducted at the Finance and Economics 
Experimental Lab at Xiamen University in Xiamen, China in May 2011 with 216 subjects 
recruited via the Online Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE) at the 
university. All laboratory sessions were computerized using the z-Tree experiment software 
package (Fischbacher, 2007). Both the instructions and the information shown on the 
computer screen were in Chinese. The instruction handouts (see Appendix A.1) were read 
aloud for everyone in the same session to hear.  Each session lasted between 30 minutes and 
one hour (including the time for signing up, reading instructions, a quiz to guarantee the 
accurate understanding of the experimental rules, and final payments.).  
        Table 2.2 shows the demographic characteristics of subjects in the three experiments. 
Subjects’ characteristics in experiment 2 are similar to those in experiment 1, except that in 
experiment 2 the ratio of students is eight percentage points higher (99% versus 91%), and 
the distribution of concentration is not identical (e.g., the ratios of economics, other social 
sciences, humanities and science majors are seven percentage points higher, seven 
percentage points lower, eleven percentage points lower, and six percentage points higher in 
experiment 2, respectively).
34 Subjects’ characteristics in experiment 3 are very similar to 
those in experiment 2, except that the ratio of economics majors is five percentages lower, 
while that of humanity majors are five percentage points higher. 
                                                 
34 There may be a concern that economics and business students play differently with other students. 
I address this concern by examining actions in the first period, as well as actions in the second period 
conditional on the coordination outcome of the first period, and find no differences between 
economics/business students and other students. Results are available upon request.    
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        Experiment 1 included 18 sessions (each had 12 or 16 subjects); experiment 2 included 
9 sessions (each had 24 subjects). In each session, I randomly assigned subjects to groups of 
four. So the whole sample consisted of 64 groups for experiment 1 and 54 groups for 
experiment 2. As discussed in Chapter 1, each experiment included two stages: the first 
stage comprised 12 periods, while the second one had eight periods. Group compositions 
were fixed in the first stage; but when subjects entered the second stage of the game, they 
were randomly reshuffled into new groups of four, and new group members might not 
necessarily come from the same treatment as in the first stage; this rule is made common 
knowledge. In the second stage, group compositions were fixed, and stakes were all set at 
the highest stake for all periods and all groups, i.e., those treated in different treatments in 
the first stage faced the same stake in each period of the second stage.  
        In this chapter I only present the results in the first stage.
35 
        In each period, I endowed subjects with 20 points and asked them to give a certain 
number of points (which I refer to as stake) to their assigned groups’ common pools. This 
stake could vary across periods, and each subject could only choose either not to give or to 
give exactly the stake. If all four members in a group gave, then each member not only got 
back the points she had given, but also gained an extra return equaling the stake; otherwise 
each member finished each period only with her points remaining, and the points she gave 
out were wasted. I avoided the use of terms with strong connotations (e.g., I use the natural 
term “give” rather than “contribute” in the instruction). Although a concrete context like a 
fictitious corporate or project may make the instruction easier to understand, I used the 
abstract terminology for two reasons. First, it was to avoid any unwanted framing or 
                                                 
35 The purpose of introducing the second stage in experiment 1 is to explore a potential externality of 
coordination building (or collapse) across various social groups (see Chapter 1). To make the results 
comparable, I also have a second stage for experiments 2 and 3. 49 
 
experimenter demand effects
36  (for a fair comparison, all three experiments adopted the 
same abstract way.) Second, the binary choice set in each period was easy to understand, 
and the examples and quiz guaranteed the accurate understanding.  
        In sum, the following formula (in the instruction, the payoff structure is presented in 
texts, which is easier for subjects to understand; see Appendix A.1) describes individual 
earnings in each period:  
, , 
,,  
  , , 
20 ,          ,
20,            
20 ,       ,  .. 
ti t j t
it i t
ti t j t
Th if A C and A C j i
Earning if A D
Th if A C and j i st A D
   

 
     
 
        where  , it Earning  is i’s earning in period t,  t Th  is the stake at t,  ,  it A  and ,  jt A  are the 
actions of i  and  j  at  t , respectively ( i  and  j   are in the same group), C  represents 
“cooperate” (“give”), and D represents “deviate” (“not give”).   
        The final payment was the performance payment plus a show-up fee of 10 yuan.
37 For 
experiment 1, the performance payment was the total earning accumulated over periods. For 
experiment 2, to deal with the concern of an income effect in the laboratory (see Section 2.4 
for details), the program randomly picked up one period’s earning of the first stage 
(multiplied by the number of periods in the first stage) as the performance payment for that 
stage; the performance payment in the second stage is the total earning for all periods in that 
stage, as in experiment 1. 
                                                 
36 Some studies (e.g., Brandts & Cooper, 2006a) adopt concrete contexts. Cooper and Kagel (2003) 
find that the use of meaningful context speeds up strategic plays.  
 
37 For the “High Show-up Fee” treatment (see the description in Section 2.4) in experiment 1, the 
show-up fee was 12 yuan. In this chapter, I will only focus on the three main treatments. The show-
up fees in experiments 1 and 2 were denominated in point and yuan, respectively.  50 
 
        The conversion rate for experiment 1 was 40 points per yuan, and that for experiment 2 
was 30 points per yuan. The more generous conversion rate in experiment 2 was considered 
necessary to insure adequate subjects in the new location where experimental payments 
were generally higher. 
        The average payments (including the show-up fees) for experiments 1 and 2 were 21.4 
and 25.9 yuan  (about 3~4 dollars),
38  respectively. These earnings could afford ordinary 
meals at student canteens for one to two days, and were sufficiently large to generate a good 
supply of subjects. Regarding the purchasing power, it is comparable to experimental 
payments (for one-hour experiments) in other countries. 
 
2.3.2  Treatment Group Assignments  
        Each experiment consisted of three main treatments: “Big Bang,” “Semi-gradualism” 
and “Gradualism.” All groups in the three main treatments face the same stake in the second 
half of the first stage (periods 7-12); but the stake paths differ in the first half (periods 1-6). 
The stakes over 12 periods are shown in Figure 2.1: for the “Big Bang” treatment, the stakes 
are always at the highest level, which is 14; for the “Semi-gradualism” treatment, they are 
two for the first six periods and set at the highest stake for the next six periods; for the 
“Gradualism” treatment, they increase from two to 12 with a step of two for the first six 
periods and fix at the highest stake for the next six periods.   
        Table  2.3  shows  the  randomizations in all three experiments (one panel for each 
experiment) worked very well in assigning subjects into the treatments. The default 
treatment is “Gradualism,” so the constant shows the means for the “Gradualism” treatment, 
                                                 
38  The exchange rate when the experiments were conducted was about 1 USD=6.7 yuan and 
1USD=6.5 yuan for experiments 1 and 2, respectively.  51 
 
and the coefficients of “Big Bang” and “Semi-gradualism” show the differences between 
those two treatments and the “Gradualism” treatment. In each experiment, there are few 
variables the values of which are statistically significantly across treatments. 
 52 
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        Since the stake paths for these treatments differ in periods 1-6, it may have imposed an 
income effect in the laboratory. To estimate how much of the difference in performances 
among the three main treatments in periods 7-12 is the real treatment effect rather than an 
income effect, I adopted two different methods in experiments 1 and 2, respectively. For 
experiment 1, I introduced the “High Show-up Fee” treatment to capture the potential 
income effect, which is identical to the “Big Bang” treatment except for a higher show-up 
fee (see Chapter 1 for more details). For experiment 2, I adopted a popular way in the 
experimental literature to eliminate the income effect: randomly picking up one period in the 
first stage, and then using the earning of that period (multiplied by the number of periods in 
the first stage) as the performance payment for the first stage.
39  Moreover, in both 
experiments, I randomized groups into various treatments, thus eliminating the potential 
effect of subjects’ incomes in the real world. 
       The information structure was as follows.  
       Regarding  the  information  structure,  the information feedback in experiment 1 was 
limited (after each period, subjects only knew whether the project was successful or not, i.e., 
whether all four group members including herself contributed), while that in experiment 2 
was richer although still imperfect (after each period, subjects knew exactly how many 
group members contributed, but not exactly who contributed). In addition, in experiment 1, 
                                                 
39 Both methods have their advantages and disadvantages. The concern about the popular method of 
random payments is that it may make some subjects less serious at playing in each period; but if this 
undesired effect is not correlated with the treatments or if others play even more seriously (because 
the earning in the selected period will be multiplied), on average it would be less a concern. On the 
other hand, the calibration of the show-up fee difference between the “High Show-up Fee” treatment 
and other treatments is difficult, although the parameter in experiment 1 turns out to be fine; 
moreover, the income effect may be nonlinear, so it is hard to extrapolate the effect of a specific 
income difference. Thus in experiments 2 and 3, I switch to the more popular way, although it is 
imperfect.  54 
 
subjects did not know the exact number of periods and the stakes of future periods 
beforehand; in experiment 2, subjects knew these. 
40 
        Communication across players was not allowed. I chose this design for two reasons. 
First, communication is often impossible or ineffective in the real world. Second, this design 
makes coordination more difficult.
41   
        At the end of the experiments, I asked subjects to complete a brief survey.  The survey 
collected information on age, gender, nationality, educational level, concentration at school, 
working status and income, in addition to eliciting risk preferences over lotteries (the 
questions on risk preferences were adopted from Holt & Laury, 2002, but in a different 
currency unit; see Appendix A.2).  
 
2.4  Results 
        In  this  section  I  present  the  findings in summary tables, figures and regressions. I 
analyze the effect of treatments on the following four outcome variables per period: whether 
a group coordinates successfully, the number of group members contributing, whether an 
individual contributes, and the individual’s earning. I compare the results of experiments 1 
and 2 (see Chapter 1 for more detailed results of experiment 1). 
        Result 1: in period 1, the contribution and success rates are higher for groups with 
a lower stake in both experiments; but there are no obvious differences regarding 
contribution rates in period 1 between experiments 1 and 2.  
                                                 
40  In some cases of the real world, people do not know the exact number of coordination 
opportunities and the levels of future interactions beforehand; in other cases, they know.  
 
41 Ostrom (2010) summarizes that communication improves cooperation. Charness (2000) shows that 
communication helps coordination in small groups, while Weber et al. (2001) and Chaudhuri et al. 
(2009) find that large group coordination is still difficult even with communication.  55 
 
        Figure 2.2 shows the success rates over periods. In period 1, for experiment 1, over two 
thirds of “Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism” groups coordinate successfully at the low 
stake, while only 16.7% (or 30%) of the “Big Bang” (or “High Show-up Fee”) groups are 
successful at the high stake. For experiment 2, about 60% of “Semi-gradualism” and 
“Gradualism’ groups coordinate successfully at the low stake, while only about 30%  of the 
“Big Bang” groups are successful at the high stake.  This result clearly confirms the 
prediction of Proposition 2.1.  56 
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A. Experiment 1 (Limited-information Weakest-link; adopted from Chapter 1)  
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B. Experiment 2 (Richer-information Weakest-link)  
          A group is successful in coordination if all four members give the stake in that period.  
Figure 2.2: Success Rates of Groups by Treatment and Period in Weakest Link Experiments 57 
 
 
        Figure 2.3 shows the contribution rates over periods. Regarding the contribution rates, 
the differences are also obvious. The contribution rates in experiment 1 are about 90% for 
“Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism” groups, and below 70% for “Big Bang” groups. The 
numbers in experiment 2 are similar: about 90% for “Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism” 
groups, and about 70% for the “Big Bang” groups. But the numbers are similar between 
experiments 1 and 2. 
        We can see the differences of success rates across treatments are much more obvious 
than those of contribution rates. This is because the efficiency in “Semi-gradualism” and 
“Gradualism” groups is much higher with a low stake: fewer subjects waste their 
contributions.  58 
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B. Experiment 2 (Richer-information Weakest-link) 
 
Figure 2.3: Contribution Rates by Treatment and Period in Weakest Link Experiments 59 
 
        Result 2: in experiment 1, the success rates in the first six periods change little 
over periods; in experiment 2, the success rates increase over the first six periods, 
especially for “Big Bang” and “Semi-gradualism” groups in which stakes are constant 
for these periods. 
        Although the contribution rates for all treatments decline steadily over periods, the 
success rates do not. This shows that contribution rates decline mainly because those 
contributing in the failed groups start giving up when they find coordination has failed.  
        Interestingly, for experiment 2 which adopts a richer information structure, success 
rates can even increase even as contribution rates declines, especially for “Big Bang” and 
“Semi-gradualism” groups. This result can be seen from Figure 2.2. Below (in result 4) I 
will further explore why success rates can increase over periods.  
 
        Result 3: in experiment 1, the success rate of the “Semi-gradualism” treatment 
decreases sharply from period 6 to period 7 (from about 70% to only 33.3%), while 
that of the “Gradualism” treatment does not; in experiment 2, both do not. 
        This is clearly shown in Figure 2.2. Thus the “Gradualism” treatment has a higher 
success rate in the high-stake periods than the “Semi-gradualism” treatment in experiment 1; 
but the difference is not obvious in experiment 2.  
        In Figure 2.4 I examine how coordination results vary across periods for each group by 
each treatment. For each group, the horizontal axis indicates the period, and the vertical axis 
indicates the number of contributors in that group: a bar with value one indicates successful 
coordination, while that with value zero indicates failed coordination. Each group is 
identified by a code in the following  way: the lowest digit indicates the treatment type 60 
 
(1=”Big Bang,” 2=Semi-gradualism,” 3=”Gradualism,” 4=”High Show-up Fee”); the 
highest one or two digits indicate the session number (1-18). On the top of the graph for 
each group is the 2-digit or 3-digit code for that group, which is constructed in the following 
way: the lowest digit indicates the treatment type (1=“Big Bang,” 2=“Semi-gradualism,” 
3=“Gradualism”); the highest one or two digits indicate the session number (1-9).  
        A further look at Figure 2.4 regarding the number of contributors for each group shows 
that all successful “Semi-gradualism” groups in period 6 keep successful in period 7 in 
experiment 2. This result partially confirms the prediction of Proposition 2.3 that a gradual 
increase of stake is always no worse than a sudden increase, although the advantage of a 
gradual increase (versus a sudden increase) is not found in experiment 2. 
        In experiment 1, the contribution rate of the “Semi-gradualism” groups decreases about 
15 percentage points from period 6 to period 7; but the success rate has a bigger (about 40 
percentage points) decrease, because the decrease in contribution rate is almost completely 
due to the deviation of one or two group members in successful groups of period 6 (see 
Figure 2.4).  
        61 
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A: “Big Bang” Groups in Experiment 1 (Limited-information Weakest-link)  
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B: “Semi-gradualism” Groups in Experiment 1 (Limited-information Weakest-link) 
 
Figure 2.4: Group Coordination Results for Each Treatment in Weakest Link Experiments 
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C: “Gradualism” Groups in Experiment 1 (Limited-information Weakest-link) 
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D: “High Show-up Fee” Groups in Experiment 1 (Limited-information Weakest-link) 
 
Figure 2.4 (Continued)63 
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E: “Big Bang” Groups in Experiment 2 (Richer-information Weakest-link) 
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F: “Semi-gradualism” Groups in Experiment 2 (Richer-information Weakest-link) 
 
Figure 2.4 (Continued)64 
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Panel G: “Gradualism” Groups in Experiment 2 (Richer-information Weakest-link) 
 
Figure 2.4 (Continued) 
 
        This different result about period 7 between experiments 1 and 2 may be due to the 
experimental setting that the sharp increase in stake is foreseeable in experiment 2 but not in 
experiment 1 (see Table 2.1 for the experimental designs). When the shock to the stake is 
unanticipated, some subjects become unwilling to contribute even their groups have 
coordinated successfully with a much lower stake. Of course there might be another reason: 
players may be more willing to try contributing when they first face a stake level if they 
know they will be informed ex post the number of contributors. However, this does not seem 
to be a good explanation because there are no differences between the two experiments in 
the contribution rates in period 1: subjects in experiment 2 are unlikely to have more 
contributing trials just because they know that the ex post feedback will be richer.  
 65 
 
        Result 4: in experiment 1, conditional on failed coordination, most groups fail with 
the same stake later; in experiment 2, when there are three out of four members 
contributing, more groups can switch from failed coordination to success at the same 
stake, but not for the “Gradualism” groups when the stake keeps increasing in the first 
six periods.  
        We  can  see  this  from  Figure  2.4. More specifically, in experiment 2 with richer 
information, there are six (seven) “Big Bang” (“Semi-gradualism”) groups with three 
contributors at the beginning, and five (four) of them are able to become successful. On the 
contrary, only two of the seven “Gradualism” groups with three contributors at the 
beginning can make it later. As a result, the difference between the success rates of “Big 
Bang” and “Gradualism” groups shrinks over time.  
        However, in experiment 1 with limited information, only one of 20 groups with three 
contributors at the beginning (seven “Big Bang,” five “Semi-gradualism,” five 
“Gradualism” and three “High Show-up Fee” groups) becomes successful later.  
        For those groups with less than three contributors, few of them can become successful 
later no matter whether the information feedback is limited or rich. In experiment 1 (or 2), 
only one (or one) of twelve (or seven) such groups succeeds subsequently. 
        This key result shows the advantage of information. When subjects are informed about 
the exact number of contributors and when they are close to success (i.e., three out of four 
contribute), they are more likely to become successful. On the contrary, if they do not know 
that they are close to success, they are much less likely to become successful. This is 
consistent with Proposition 2.2. 66 
 
        This result shows that gradualism helps in weakest-link coordination building by the 
channel of “information gathering” which facilitates belief updating. In experiment 1 with 
limited information, by having more groups successful at the beginning with a low stake and 
increasing the stake slowly, gradualism helps provide the key information for a successful 
group at the beginning that they are close to the final success with a high stake; for the “Big 
Bang” treatment, a high beginning stake harms coordination and since subjects in a failed 
group do not know how many members have contributed, they do not know how far they are 
from success, thus very difficult to become successful in the next period even they only need 
one more contributor to succeed. Such an “information gathering” function of gradualism 
can also be provided by the richer information structure, so in experiment 2 even “Big 
Bang” groups can attain information about how close they are to the final success, which 
facilitates coordination and makes success rates increase over time.            
        It is noteworthy that the information is still imperfect even in experiment 2: subjects 
only know how many members have contributed, but not exactly who and they do not know 
the decision history of a specific member. This is different from the studies by Berninghaus 
and Ehrhart (2001), and Brandts and Cooper (2006a) on the role of perfect ex post 
monitoring, and Deck and Nikiforakis (2010) on the effect of perfect real time monitoring in 
coordination.
42 This study shows that even a small piece of further information (the exact 
                                                 
42 These studies find a positive effect of perfect monitoring in coordination games. In Berninghaus 
and Ehrhart (2001), there are three treatments about the information feedback of a previous period: 
the group minimum effort, the distribution of group members’ choices, and each group member’s 
individual choice. The first and second treatment are similar to the limited information and the richer 
information cases in this chapter, respectively, except that in their experiment the entire history data 
are shown on the computer screen, while in this study only the result of the previous period is shown 
to subjects. Consistent with this study, they also find the richer (but still imperfect) information 
structure improves coordination, although their sample size is small. However, Deck and Nikiforakis 
(2010) find imperfect monitoring (when individuals can only observe the actions of their immediate 
neighbors in a circle network) cannot improve coordination efficiency. Although Devetag (2005) 67 
 
number of contributors) can facilitate coordination. This is meaningful because we may not 
need perfect monitoring and associated punishments (e.g., Fehr & Gächter, 2000; Fudenburg 
& Pathak, 2011) (which are often costly and difficult) to improve coordination.   
        Remember that there are multiple dimensions of differences between experiments 1 and 
2, as shown in Table 2.1. So is the different effect of gradualism really due to the different 
information feedback about exactly how many group members contribute? The analysis 
above for each specific group (see Figure 2.4) does show that the key is really regarding 
how the groups with three contributors perform differently in subsequent periods when they 
are told the exact number of contributors and when they are not. In addition, contribution 
rates in period 1 for each treatment between experiments 1 and 2 are very similar (see Figure 
2.3), which shows that other settings of the experimental design are less likely to drive the 
difference of results in experiments 1 and 2 (except the different results of the “Semi-
gradualism” treatment in period 7 between these two experiments, which is most likely due 
to whether the shock is anticipated, as shown in the aforementioned result 3). To further 
prove this, I ran several supplementary sessions the design of which is identical to that of 
experiment 2 except that subjects only know whether the project is successful but not 
exactly how many members contribute, as in experiment 1. The results (shown in Appendix 
A.5) are closer to those of experiment 1 than those of experiment 2, which confirms that the 
piece of information regarding the exact number of contributors is really the key. 
                                                                                                                                                      
states all treatments in his study provide full information feedback, the information structure is 
actually still imperfect (as the richer information case in this chapter) since only the distributions of 
group members’ actions, but not individual choices, are revealed. He finds that such a richer 
information structure cannot help coordination. Dorsey (1992) and Kurzban et al. (2008) find a 
positive effect of real time perfect monitoring on a continuous public goods game and a trust game, 
respectively.  68 
 
        Note that in the first six periods, the stake of the “Gradualism” treatment is always 
increasing but that of the other treatments is constant. This may explain why in experiment 2 
fewer “Gradualism” groups with three contributors become successful than “Big Bang” and 
“Semi-gradualism” groups do. For a group with three out of four members contributing, if 
the next stake is the same, they know they are close to success in the next period; but if the 
next stake increases (it is a small increase in the absolute sense but not in the relative sense), 
they may feel that they are even farther from success: if one group member does not 
contribute at a low stake, even if you allow a possibility that she has made a mistake (thus 
her real intention is to contribute that stake), you may hardly believe that there is a large 
chance she would contribute at a higher stake. If this is indeed the reason, a minor 
modification of the “Gradualism” treatment may make it work better: introducing repetitions 
for each lower stake. For example, the stakes over periods before the final high stake can be 
2, 2, 4, 4, 6, 6, 8, 8, 10, 10, 12, 12 (each lower-stake project is replicated; for a more robust 
path, each can be replicated twice; another possible way, which might be less robust, is to 
have a smaller step). Under this new path, those “Gradualism” groups with three 
contributors may be more likely to become successful in the next period before it reaches the 
high stake. Then we may find a more obvious advantage of gradualism with a richer 
information structure than what is found in experiment 2, because gradualism guarantees a 
higher proportion of groups with four or three contributors (i.e., successful or almost 
successful) at the beginning: Table 2.4 (along with Figure 2.4) shows that in experiment 2, 
the number of “Big Bang” groups with four (or three) contributors in period 1 is six (or six) 
out of 18 groups, while those of “Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism” groups are 10 (or 
seven) and 11 (or seven); similarly, in experiment 1, the numbers are three (or seven) for 69 
 
“Big Bang” groups, 13 (or five) for “Semi-gradualism” groups, and 13 (or five) for 
“Gradualism” groups.  
 70 
 71 
 
        Result 5: Conditional on successful coordination at t, most groups succeed with the 
same stake at t+1.   
        We can see this from Table 2.4. In experiment 1 (or 2), there are only seven (or 10) 
exceptions.  
        Figure  2.5  shows  the  average  individual earnings, which helps answer whether 
gradualism works better from the perspective of social welfare. In experiment 1, clearly the 
“Gradualism” treatment has the highest average earning; in experiment 2, the difference 
between the “Big Bang” and “Gradualism” treatments is insignificant, while the average 
earning for the “Semi-gradualism” treatment is lower in the first six periods because of a 
lower earning potential (the stakes are low) but catches up with the other two treatments in 
the six high-stake periods. 
        Tables 2.5 and 2.6 report formal regressions for experiments 1 and 2, respectively. It 
clearly shows that gradualism works best in experiment 1, while its advantage is less 
obvious in experiment 2. I also employ probit and logit specifications (unreported) when the 
dependent variable is whether an individual contributes or whether a group succeeds in 
coordination, and the results are very similar. When the dependent variables are 
contributions and earnings, which are at the individual level, additional regressions 
(unreported) with survey controls show very similar results.  72 
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Figure 2.5: Individual Earnings by Treatment and Period in Weakest Link Experiments 
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2.5  Further Theoretical Discussions on Weakest-link Games 
2.5.1  The Myopic Assumption 
        In the simple model, I adopt the myopic assumption. In reality, some players may be 
forward looking. For example, they may employ the following strategy: contributing at the 
beginning, thus inducing others to contribute subsequently. However, the myopic 
assumption does not affect the explanatory power of this simple model. The experimental 
results show that not all players (especially those with a high starting stake) use this strategy; 
so even such a strategy exists, it is more likely to be used when the risk is lower, which is 
consistent with the belief-based learning model. Moreover, even the number of periods and 
the stake path are anticipated in experiment 2 but not in experiment 1 (which suggests that 
this strategy should be more likely to happen in experiment 2), I find no obvious differences 
regarding the contribution rates in period 1 between experiments 1 and 2.  
 
2.5.2  Evidence of Belief-based Learning in the Literature 
        Although I do not formally test whether the subjects play according to their beliefs in 
this study, some recent papers confirm that the majority of, although not all, subjects behave 
consistently with their beliefs (e.g., Nyarko & Schotter, 2002; Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker, 
2008; Rey-Biel, 2009).
43  Direct belief elicitation methods, especially in an incentive-
compatible way, become increasingly popular in experimental economics (e.g., Offerman et 
al., 1996, 2001; Nyarko & Schotter, 2002; Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker, 2008; Rey-Biel, 
2009; Hyndman et al., 2009; Tingley & Wang, 2010). I finally gave up doing this because 
                                                 
43  Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) study the dynamics of free riding in standard public goods 
experiments, and find that belief updating and social preferences are both important in explaining the 
results. 76 
 
the main purpose of this study is to cleanly test whether gradualism works, and I had a 
concern that asking belief questions in each period would have undesirable effects on 
subjects’ playing which may contaminate the results. The literature supports this concern: 
several other studies (Costa-Gomes & Weizsäcker, 2008; and especially, Rutström & 
Wilcox, 2004, 2009) do show that eliciting players’ beliefs induce more sophistication and 
higher-order rationalities, thus affecting their actions.  
        The  belief-based  learning  framework can also explain the main results of other 
minimum-effort coordination games in the literature. For example, Van Huyck et al. (1990) 
find that most subjects play the minimum reported in the earlier period, which suggests that 
they do update their beliefs about the minimum effort of group members according to the 
outcome of the previous period, and choose their best responses based on their beliefs. 
Moreover, by introducing a noise (“mistake”) in playing, the framework can also explain a 
minor “overshooting” phenomenon (see pp 241, Section V of their paper) that a few subjects 
play below the minimum of the preceding period and choose the securest action: if the 
opponents may make mistakes with some probability, the real intention of the least-
cooperative opponent may be to play below the observed minimum of the preceding period; 
even if his real intention is to play the observed minimum, in the next period he may make a 
mistake and choose a lower effort. Of course, this might not be the only way to explain the 
“overshooting” phenomenon.  
        This framework is also consistent with the main results of Weber (2006), who studies 
gradualism in organizational growth: starting with a large group size makes one believe that 
there is a low probability that all partners will choose a large effort, so it is less likely to 
reach a high equilibrium. On the contrary, starting with a small group size will give one a 77 
 
high belief that all partners will choose a large effort.
44 And if a new group member knows 
the previous successful coordination history of the group, she will have a high belief that all 
partners will choose a large effort (and other partners, knowing that the entrant knows the 
history, will also have a high belief that the entrant will choose a large effort), so they can 
maintain a successful coordination when the group enlarges. However, if the entrant cannot 
observe the history, a high trust among the entrant and incumbents cannot be easily 
established, leading to a coordination failure when the group expands.  
         
2.5.3  Other Explanations 
2.5.3.1 Reinforcement Learning 
        There are two main types of learning models: belief-based learning and reinforcement 
learning models, which are both incorporated in a general model of experience-weighted 
attraction (EWA) learning model (Camerer & Ho, 1999).
45 Unlike a belief-based learning 
model adopted in this chapter, reinforcement learning models assume that players do not 
have beliefs about what other players will do, and the propensity to choose a strategy 
depends on its past payoffs rather than the history of play that created those payoffs.  
        Previous studies (see the summary by Camerer, 2003) show that reinforcement learning 
generally fits experimental results worse than belief learning in coordination games. 
Similarly, a standard naïve reinforcement learning model does not apply well for the results 
                                                 
44 The larger the group size, the smaller the probability one perceives that all partners’ efforts exceed 
a certain amount.  
 
45 There are other models such as the quantile response equilibrium (QRE) model (McKelvey & 
Palfrey, 1995). As suggested by Brandts and Cooper (2006b), given the strong dynamics and history 
dependence in the experimental data of this study, static models such as QRE are not good 
candidates. Thus I focus on learning models in which some players have bounded rationality and 
learn how to respond from their experiences.  78 
 
of experiment 1. It predicts that subjects who benefit from cooperating by period 6 should 
adopt the passive strategy of continuous cooperation from period 7; but this contrasts the 
findings regarding the “Semi-gradualism” treatment.  
 
2.5.3.2 An Adaptive Dynamics Model 
        Crawford (1995) and Weber (2005, 2006) adopt an adaptive dynamics model, in which 
every subject employs a linear latent strategy weighting own action and the minimum action 
of group members in the previous period.
46 Their model does not apply for this study for two 
reasons. First, in their experiments, there are seven action choices in each period, making a 
linear continuous latent strategy more relevant; in this study there are only two choices in 
each period, which is “more discrete.” Second, in their experiments, the game is repeated 
identically for all periods; in this study the stake may change over periods, so a linear 
weighting of previous actions cannot well predict or guide actions in the current period.   
 
2.5.3.3 Conditional Cooperation 
        Conditional  cooperation  assumes  that players are willing to cooperate if others 
cooperate as well (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001). Based on the same reason in Section 
2.5.3.1, a simple story of conditional cooperation does not work, either. A weaker version of 
conditional cooperation may fit the results better: if others cooperate in the previous period, 
then own cooperation in the current period leads to a higher non-monetary psychological 
                                                 
46  Specifically, in their models, player i ’s latent strategy in period t is given by the following 
formula:  ,, 1 1 , (1 ) it it t it ax y       , where  ,1 it x   is i ’s discrete action in period  1 t  ,  1 t y   is 
the minimum action of group members in period  1 t  , and 01    . The  , it  are distributed 
normally, with mean zero and variance 
2
t  . Player i’s discrete action  , it x  in period t is determined 
by the latent variable  , it a  (e.g., by rounding  , it a  to the nearest discrete action).  79 
 
gain than non-cooperation, but it does not necessarily mean that one would keep 
cooperating. Whether one will choose to cooperate depends on the relative importance of 
conditional cooperation and self-interest in her preference.  If the stake increases too 
quickly, then one will choose not to cooperate if she has a low belief that others will still 
cooperate at a much higher stake and if self-regarding dominates conditional cooperation in 
her preference structure.  
        Conditional cooperation sometimes means that players are willing to cooperate if she 
believes that others will cooperate as well. By this definition, I cannot really distinguish 
conditional cooperation and self-interest in these two experiments, because under the 
weakest-link payoff structure, the best response for a self-interested person is to cooperate if 
she believes that all others will cooperate. However, even such conditional cooperation exist 
beyond a pure self-interest preference, it is compatible with the belief-based learning 
process. In Section 7 I present a third experiment with the chance for free riding and find 
that coordination often collapse after success, which shows that conditional cooperation may 
not apply very well, so what drives subjects’ behaviors in these experiments is more likely 
to be belief updating. 
 
2.5.3.4 Inertia 
        Psychological  inertia
47   refers to indisposition to change. It is not successful at 
explaining why “Semi-gradualism” groups in experiment 1 cannot maintain successful 
coordination when the stake increases quickly.  
 
                                                 
47 Inertia has been studied in behavioral public finance issues such as individual saving behaviors 
(e.g., Madrian & Shea, 2001; Thaler & Benartzi, 2004).  80 
 
2.5.3.5 Preferences for Consistency 
        A similar psychological theory is preferences for consistency (Cialdini et al., 1995), 
which means that once people make a choice or take a stand, they encounter personal and 
interpersonal pressures to behave consistently with that commitment. Similar with inertia, it 
cannot well explain why “Semi-gradualism” groups in experiment 1 fail to maintain 
successful coordination. 
 
2.5.3.6 Limited Attention and Bounded Awareness 
        Since the stake step in the “Gradualism” treatment is small, is the gradualism effect 
(which is more obvious in experiment 1) due to limited attention (for a review, see 
DellaVigna, 2009), or bounded awareness (Gino & Bazerman, 2009)? The answer is no. 
First, subjects were doing the single coordination task in this study, so there was no other 
information or tasks which would distract their “limited attention.” Second, although the 
absolute increment of the stake in the gradualism treatment is small (two points per period), 
it is significantly larger than those in the experiments of Gino and Bazerman (2009) and 
Offerman and van der Veen (2010), which adopt much more gradual settings. Actually, in 
this study, the step of two is quite a large increase in the relative sense, ranging between 
100% of the stake size in period 1 and 16.7% of the stake size in period 6.  
 
2.6  When Free Riding Is Possible 
        To examine whether  gradualism (with a richer but imperfect information structure) 
helps build coordination (or “cooperation”) when free riding is possible, I conducted a third 
experiment. In experiment 3, in each period it requires at least three contributors in a four-81 
 
person group to make the project successful. It can be classified as a discrete public good 
game or a coordination game.
48  It was conducted in May 2011 at the same location as 
experiment 2. For other features, experiment 3 is identical to experiment 2; moreover, 
subjects in experiment 3 are comparable to those in experiment 2 (see Table 2.2). There are 
six sessions, each of which includes 24 subjects (two groups for each treatment). In total I 
have 12 groups for each treatment.  
        The payoff structure of experiment 3 is similar to that of experiments 1 and 2 except for 
the potential for free riding. If at least the required number (which is four in experiments 1 
and 2, and three in experiment 3) of group members contribute, everyone in the group gets 
back twice the stake no matter whether she contributes; otherwise she loses her contribution. 
If more than the required number of group members contribute, then extra contributions will 
be equally divided among all group members.
49 The following formula (in the instruction, 
the payoff structure is presented in texts and a table, which is easier for subjects to 
understand; see Appendix A.1) describes individual earnings in each period of experiment 
3:
50 
                                                 
48 Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984) and Schram et al. (2008) are two discrete pubic goods studies which 
also adopt a binary choice set. It can be classified as an order-statistic game, one type of coordination 
games, since a player’s payoff depends on her own choice and an order statistic of all group 
members’ contributions (here the order statistic is the second-to-minimum contribution; in the 
weakest-link games, it is the minimum.) 
 
49  This rebate method is called “proportional rebate” in Marks and Croson (1998). 
 
50  As in experiment 2, the program randomly picks up one period’s earning in the first stage 
(multiplied by the number of periods in the first stage) as the performance payment for that stage. 82 
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        where  , it Earning  is i’s earning in period t,  t Th  is the stake at t,  ,  it A  and ,  jt A  are the 
actions of i  and  j  at  t , respectively ( i  and  j   are in the same group.) C  represents 
“cooperate” (“give”), while D represents “deviate” (“not give”). The function  ,  1( ) jt A C   
has a value one if  ,  jt A C  , and zero otherwise.  
        Figure 2.6 shows the success rate, contribution rate, and average individual earning for 
each treatment. Figure 2.7 shows the coordination result (the number of contributors) for 
each group by treatment. For each group, the horizontal axis indicates the period, and the 
vertical axis indicates the number of contributors. On the top of the graph for each group is 
the 2-digit or 3-digit code for that group, which is constructed in the following way: the 
lowest digit indicates the treatment type (1=“Big Bang,” 2=“Semi-gradualism,” 
3=“Gradualism”); the highest one or two digits indicate the session number (1-6).  
        We can see lots of fluctuations in Figures 2.6 and 2.7: equilibrium is much less stable, 
and switching from one to another or to a non-equilibrium outcome is common. All results 
confirm the above concern and clearly show that all treatments do poorly at a high stake. 
Although gradualism has higher contribution and success rates at the beginning, 
coordination falls apart soon.  83 
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A group is successful in coordination if three or four members give the stake in that period. 
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Figure 2.6: Performances of Treatments in Experiment 3 (with a Chance for Free Riding) 84 
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C: Individual Earnings 
 
Figure 2.6 (Continued) 85 
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Figure 2.7: Group Coordination Results for Each Treatment in Experiment 3  
(With a Chance for Free Riding) 
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Figure 2.7 (Continued) 
 
        Table 2.7 shows the performances of the treatments in periods 7-12 of experiments 2 
and 3. In experiment 3 the gradualism groups have a lower contribution rate, and do not 
perform better regarding success rates and earnings: gradualism alone cannot build 
coordination when free riding is possible.  
        The lower panel of Table 2.7 compares results of experiments 2 and 3, and shows a 
surprising (but understandable) finding that coordination becomes more difficult rather than 
easier when we allow free riding. Actually, allowing free riding worsens the performances 
of all treatments. Not only the contribution rates, but also the success rates and individual 
earnings are much lower than the weakest-link case.
51 For example, the contribution rates in 
                                                 
51 Schram et al. (2008) show that fixing the required number of contributors and given that a chance 
for free riding exists, the larger the group, the lower the contribution rate, but the higher the success 
rate. Experiments 2 and 3 differ from their study in both the experimental design and the result. First, 
I fix the group size but change the required number of contributors, and free riding is possible only in 
experiment 3. Second, this study shows that a lower required number of contributors decreases not 87 
 
periods 7-12 of “Big Bang,” “Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism” treatments in experiment 
3 are 18.2, 37.3 and 44.7 percentage points lower than those in experiment 2, respectively; 
average individual earnings per period in periods 7-12 in experiment 3 are 5.3, 6.7 and 7.6 
points lower (given an endowment of 20 points per period) for these treatments;
52 success 
rates are 29.2, 43.1 and 49.5 percentage points lower. All these differences are economically 
substantial and statistically significant, and larger for the gradualism treatment.        
 
                                                                                                                                                      
only the contribution rate, but also the success rate. This suggests that the effect of the gap between 
the required number of contributors and the group size on the success rate may be nonlinear, and 
whether free riding is possible may be a turning point.  
 
52 The average payment (including the show-up fee) for experiments 3 was 24.9 yuan, one yuan (or 
30 points) lower than that for experiment 2. 88 
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        The result of experiment 3 shows that gradualism alone without perfect monitoring 
cannot help when free riding is possible. Since the information structure in experiment 3 is 
still imperfect, we cannot rule out the possibility that gradualism works for the free riding 
case when there is perfect monitoring (i.e., subjects are provided the feedback about who 
have contributed) or when it is not conducted anonymously. It will be interesting to test 
whether gradualism becomes helpful when we combine it with other institutions (e.g., 
perfect monitoring, sanctions, social pressure, etc.). In addition, there might be other 
“gradualism” approaches which apply in other real world examples.  
        In  experiment  3,  coordination  often collapses after success, which shows that 
conditional cooperation does not apply well, so what drives subjects’ behaviors in all three 
experiments is more likely to be belief updating. Gradualism works better in the weakest-
link coordination games because belief updating across periods is more consistent, but not 
when free riding is possible because belief updating becomes much less consistent and much 
more difficult. 
 
2.7  Conclusions 
        The findings in this chapter show that gradualism -- defined as increasing the stake 
level required for coordination step-by-step -- can serve as a powerful mechanism for 
achieving socially optimal outcomes in weakest-link coordination especially when the 
information feedback is limited: gradualism significantly outperforms the big-bang 
approach, which shows that starting at a low level is important for later coordination at a 
substantial level. In addition, a gradual increase in stake is better than a sudden increase in 
one weakest-link game when the shock to the stake is unanticipated.  90 
 
        The  role  of  gradualism  is  less  obvious when the information feedback is richer. 
Detailed analyses of experimental data and theoretical discussions show that gradualism 
works through gathering the key information about how far a group is from success in a 
high-stake coordination project. A richer information structure also provides such 
information, so the advantage of gradualism is most obvious when feedback is limited. I also 
suggest that a more gradual stake path of the “Gradualism” treatment may work better: the 
bottom line is that by starting at a low stake gradualism guarantees a higher proportion of 
successful or almost-successful groups at the beginning, and a more gradual path not only 
maintains successful coordination, but also may switch a group from failure to success. This 
hypothesis can be tested in a future experiment.  
        Compared to the first experiment, the second experiment with a richer information 
structure shows that a further piece of (but still imperfect) information largely facilitates 
coordination (especially for the big-bang treatment), which has important implications for 
policy designs because perfect monitoring is often costly and difficult, as the literature on 
contract theory and organizational economics shows. Monitoring in the second experiment 
with a richer information structure is still imperfect in two senses. The first is that subjects 
do not know which members (identified only by codes) contribute (and which do not). The 
second is that the experiment is conducted anonymously, so subjects face no or little social 
pressure.  
        I propose a belief-based learning framework, which is consistent with results of the two 
weakest-link games in this chapter and other studies on coordination games such as Van 
Huyck et al. (1990) and Weber (2005, 2006). These findings are not well explained by naïve 91 
 
reinforcement learning, conditional cooperation, inertia, preferences for consistency, and 
limited attention (or at least standard versions of these explanations).  
        I do not formally test belief-based learning in this chapter, which I show is the most 
likely mechanism of gradualism in weakest-link games. Although the belief elicitation 
method in the literature is imperfect, in the future I may use it to suggestively show whether 
belief updating is occurring and whether agents play according to their beliefs. I can also test 
this by exploring whether gradualism helps most for people who do not know their group 
members rather than for those who are friends of each other before the experiment, since the 
latter group already has a higher trust level even without gradualism.  
        Unfortunately, the optimistic roles of gradualism and a richer information structure in 
coordination are not found when free riding is possible. Although gradualism leads to a 
higher success rate at the beginning with a lower stake, this advantage cannot sustain. 
Actually all treatments perform worse than in the weakest-link case. I interpret this result in 
the way that gradualism alone does not help when free riding is possible. Future studies are 
desired to examine whether gradualism works under this case when we combine it with 
perfect monitoring, social pressure, sanctions or other institutions.  
        This chapter builds on Chapter 1 and uses various information and payoff structures to 
explore when gradualism works and why, and suggests how to make it work better. It shows 
the positive roles of richer information feedback and the weakest-link payoff structure in 
coordination. It also suggests that the popular hypothesis of gradualism cannot be taken for 
granted: the effect of gradualism varies across different conditions. 92 
 
3. DOES GRADUALISM BUILD TRUST? EVIDENCE FROM 
A MULTI-ROUND EXPERIMENT 
 
3.1.  Introduction 
        Trust, defined by Mayer et al. (1995) as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to 
the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular 
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other 
party,” is viewed as a lubricant for social interactions and market efficiency (e.g., Arrow, 
1974; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995; La Porta et al., 1997; Knack & Keefer, 1997; Guiso 
et al., 2007). However, untrustworthiness of some trustees will harm the trusting behavior 
and discourage trust. For one-shot interactions, self-interested rational agents expect that 
strangers will be untrustworthy and choose not to trust. Thus it may not be too surprising 
that low levels of trust are generally found in the experimental literature (see, e.g., Camerer, 
2003; Bohnet & Croson, 2004; Kramer & Cook, 2004; Bohnet, 2008).  
        This chapter experimentally studies a potential mechanism to promote trust, as well as 
the evolution and interaction of trust and trustworthiness over time. Specifically, it focuses 
on the hypothesis of gradualism (or incrementalism) which suggests that a high level of trust 
should be built up slowly rather than immediately. This issue may be theoretically complex. 
On the one hand, standard game theory suggests that in the stage game, the subgame perfect 
equilibrium is for the trustor not to trust and for the trustee to be untrustworthy if the trustor 
trusts. Playing these actions in each round is the unique subgame perfect equilibrium for 
finitely interactions, no matter how stakes change over time. On the other hand, when 93 
 
players have other-regarding preferences like reciprocity, they may behave inconsistently 
with the standard theoretical prediction. For example, one can imagine that the trustee 
belongs to either a “reciprocal type” or a “selfish type,” which is unknown to the trustor. In a 
repeated setting, the reciprocal trustee will always reciprocate the trustor, while the selfish 
trustee, with a high probability (as long as the time horizon is long enough), will try to hide 
his type by reciprocating the trustor until a certain round so that the trustor does not stop 
trusting. A low stake at the beginning makes it cheap for the trustee to give up immediate 
gains from betrayal and for the trustor to take a risk in investing; once successful 
cooperation is established, it may maintain with slightly larger stakes. But as the game 
proceeds towards the end round, the probability that the selfish trustee betrays approaches 
one.  
        Previous  research  either supports (e.g., Rapoport et al., 2003; Roberts & Renwick, 
2003; Cochard et al., 2004; Bohnet & Meier, 2005; Johansson-Stenman et al., 2005; 
Kurzban et al., 2008) or doubts (Pillutla et al., 2003; Pitchford & Snyder, 2004; Ho & 
Weigelt, 2005) this gradualism hypothesis (see Section 3.2 for details), but none of them 
provides a clear test how exogenous early stake paths affect trust and trustworthiness in final 
high-stake interactions. Thus this chapter employs an empirical (experimental) method and 
tries to explore how trust and trustworthiness evolve under various stake paths.  
        In the experimental literature, trust and trustworthiness are measured by investment or 
trust games introduced by Berg et al. (1995) (for reviews, see Bohnet, 2008; Cardenas & 
Carpenter 2008). The trustor is endowed with some monetary units and asked to pass an 
amount (investment) up to the endowment; the amount sent is multiplied by some factor k>1 
(say, tripled). Then the trustee (either endowed or not) is asked to return an amount up to the 94 
 
total output. Trust is measured by the ratio of investment to the turstor’s endowment, while 
trustworthiness is measured by the ratio of returned amount to the investment (or output). 
Although this measure may not measure pure trust, it is a standard experimental measure 
and captures substantial aspects of trust (Ben-Ner & Halldorsson, 2010; Brülhart & Usunier, 
2012).
53  
        This  chapter  adopts  a  binary  variant
54  of the trust game to test the gradualism 
hypothesis.
  In each round of the experiments, subjects (both trustors and trustees) are 
endowed with some money. First, the trustor is asked to invest a certain amount (referred to 
stake) on the randomly matched trustee. She
55 can only choose not to invest or to invest 
exactly the stake. If the trustor does not invest, both the trustor and the trustee end the round 
with their endowments. Otherwise the investment triples and the trustee decides how much 
to return to the trustor. His decision is also binary: to return either an unfair amount (half of 
the stake) or a fair amount (twice the stake). If he returns an unfair amount, the trustor loses 
half the stake from the endowment, while the trustee earns twice and half of the stake 
beyond the endowment; if he returns the fair amount, each of them earns the stake beyond 
the endowment, which leads to an equal outcome. No sending and returning an unfair 
                                                 
53 The trust game may measure neither the trustor’s pure expectation (i.e., trust attitude) about the 
trustee’s trustworthiness nor the trustee’s reciprocity. The trust measure may also involve 
unconditional kindness (Cox, 2004; Ashraf et al., 2006), risk aversion (Schechter, 2007), and betray 
aversion (Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Bohnet et al., 2008). The trustworthiness measure may 
involve altruism (Cox, 2004) and inequality aversion (Ciriolo, 2007). In repeated games, they may 
also involve strategic considerations rather than pure trust and trustworthiness. In this chapter I 
follow the tradition and use the term “trust” and “trustworthiness,” but refer to them as cooperative 
behaviors of trustors and trustees in the investment setting rather than their preferences or attitudes.  
 
54 Some studies (e.g., Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Engle-warnick & Slonim, 2004; Bohnet et al., 
2008) also adopt a binary structure. 
 
55 For ease of understanding, I refer to the trustor as “she” and the trustee as “he.” 95 
 
amount is the subgame perfect equilibrium of the trust game, given that the players are mere 
money-maximizers. 
        There are 12 rounds in this experiment. As in Chapters 1 and 2, the path of the stake, 
which may or may not change over rounds, is determined by the exogenously assigned 
treatment. I introduce three main treatments of stake patterns, which differ in the first six 
rounds but have an identical stake for the final six rounds. The first treatment has a constant 
high stake for all 12 rounds; I call this “Big Bang.” The second treatment has a constant low 
stake for the first six rounds and jumps to the high stake for the final six rounds; I call this 
“Semi-gradualism.”  Finally, in the “Gradualism” treatment, the stake gradually increases in 
each of the first six rounds until it reaches the high stake in round 7. Note that the “Semi-
gradualism” treatment falls between the “Big Bang” and “Gradualism” treatments: its stake 
starts at low but has a sudden increase. Exploiting this design, I test the effect of gradualism 
on trust building at a high stake.  
       I find that at the beginning the trust rate is the same for all treatments, but more trustees 
are untrustworthy when the starting stake is high; as a result, the “Big Bang” treatment has a 
lower level of subsequent trust. Interestingly, in the second half of the experiment (rounds 7-
12) with the high stake, trustworthiness is similar across treatments. There is no performance 
difference between a slow increase in stake (the “Gradualism” treatment) and a sudden 
increase (the “Semi-gradualism” treatment). Finally, the gradualism approach cannot avoid 
the “end-of-game” effect: trustworthiness and trust for all treatments collapse in the last 
round. 96 
 
       The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.2, I discuss the literature on 
dynamic trust games. In Section 3.3, I detail the experimental design. In Section 3.4, I 
present the major results. Section 3.5 concludes. 
 
3.2.  Literature on Dynamics in Trust Games 
        This section discusses more about the literature on the effects of stake size and stake 
path in trust games. To be focused, I largely ignore the literature on dynamics of other 
games, which can be found in Chapters 1 and 2.  
        The gradualism hypothesis implies that a lower stake should lead to higher trust and 
trustworthiness, which are confirmed in some studies and buy not in others. Johansson-
Stenman et al. (2005) study the comparative statistics of stakes in trust games and find 
that the trust level decreases with the stake. Similarly, in a centipede game (two subjects 
play the roles of “trustor” and “trustee” in turn), Rapoport et al. (2003) report that when the 
number of players increases from two to three and stakes are sufficiently high, defection 
occurs very early in the interaction. They also find that players are more reluctant to trust in 
later stages than in earlier ones and are more trustworthy if they are certain of the trustor’s 
intention. On the contrary, Ho and Weigelt (2005) study a multistage trust game which is 
close to a centipede game, and find that subjects are more trusting and trustworthy when the 
stake size increases tenfold.  
        Some evidences suggest that players endogenously choose to gradually increase their 
trust levels. Roberts and Renwick (2003) present a series of games resembling the prisoner’s 
dilemma in which investment can be varied across rounds. They find that investment 
increases over the course of successive rounds, suggesting that players use a strategy of 97 
 
gradually increasing their trust if previous investment in their partner is reciprocated. 
Cochard et al. (2004) find that trustors (trustees) send (return) a larger ratio than in the one-
shot game; in addition, the amount sent and the proportion returned increase over time. 
Bohnet and Meier (2005) compares a distrust game with a trust game, and find that the same 
level of trust leads to lower trustworthiness when the default is full trust than when the 
default is no trust, which suggests that building trust incrementally may be a better way for 
the trustor. Kurzban et al. (2008) show that subjects prefer starting with smaller levels of 
investment and increasing it, rather than the other way around.  
        In  contrast,  other  studies  suggest that the gradual way of trust building may not 
necessarily work. In a one-shot trust game, Pillutla et al. (2003) demonstrate that showing a 
large amount of trust in a one-shot interaction leads to more reciprocation than showing 
intermediate amounts of trust. Specifically, they find that trustors only benefit (i.e., trustees 
return more than trustors send), on average, when they send all or almost all of their 
endowments. Results suggest that trustees view sending less than (almost) everything as a 
lack of trust and thus not feel obligated to reciprocate enough to reward the trustor. This 
contrasts with incremental models of the trust process, which suggest that trustors should 
take small initial risks and build trust gradually. Pitchford and Snyder (2004) develop a 
theoretical model where the sequence of gradually smaller investments solves the holdup 
problem when the buyer’s ability to hold up a seller’s investment is severe. However, this 
prediction contradicts the experimental results in Kurzban et al. (2008) aforementioned.  
        Building on the literature, this chapter experimentally explores whether an exogenous 
gradual stake path helps build up trust and trustworthiness. The exogenous way helps 98 
 
answer whether a gradual path better builds high-level trust, rather than whether it is chosen 
by players. 
 
3.3.  Experimental Designs 
3.3.1.  Sample and Payoff Structure 
        The  design  of  the  trust  experiment is similar with the coordination experiments in 
Chapters 1 and 2. It was conducted at the Finance and Economics Experimental Lab at 
Xiamen University in Xiamen, China in July 2011 with 120 subjects recruited via the Online 
Recruitment System for Economic Experiments (ORSEE) at the university. Table 3.1 shows 
the demographic characteristics of subjects. The subjects are generally young with an 
average age around 21, since 95% of them are college or graduate students. Exactly half of 
them are male. 8% are (or were) majored in economics, 7% in other social sciences, 24% in 
business, 13% in humanities, 25% in science, 17% in engineering, and 3% in 
medical/health.  The average individual annual income in the year of 2010 falls between 
5,000 yuan and 10,000 yuan. Thus subjects’ characteristics are similar to those in Chapters 1 
and 2, except that the distribution of concentration is not identical.  99 
 
Table 3.1: Demographic Characteristics of Subjects in the Trust Game 
Variable  Mean and  standard deviation  Observations 
Age 21.32  (2.52)  120 
Male 0.50  (0.50) 120 
Income 1.20  (1.15)  120 
Family Income  5.52 (2.90)  120 
Family 
Economic 
Status 
2.44 (0.89)  120 
Risk Aversion 
Index 
4.85 (1.79)  120 
Han nationality  0.93 (0.25)  120 
Student 0.95  (0.22)  120 
Concentration:    120 
Economics 0.08  (0.28)  120 
Other Social 
Sciences 
0.07 (0.25)  120 
Business 0.24  (0.43) 120 
Humanity 0.13  (0.34)  120 
Science 0.25  (0.43)  120 
Engineering 0.17  (0.37)  120 
Medical/Health 0.03  (0.18)  120 
Note: Income is a scale variable from 0 to 13, with a higher value indicating a 
higher income (0: no income; 1: annual income<5000 yuan; 13: annual 
income>160,000 yuan). Family income is a scale variable from 1 to 12, with a 
higher value indicating a higher income (1: annual income<5000 yuan; 12: 
annual income>200,000 yuan). Family economic status is coded in the 
following way: 1 (lower), 2 (lower middle), 3 (middle), 4 (upper middle), 
5 (upper). Risk aversion index is a scale from 0 to 10, with a higher value 
approximately indicating higher risk aversion, and is measured as the number 
of lottery A chosen by the subject in the questionnaire (see Appendix A.2). 
 
        As  in  coordination  games  in  Chapters 1 and 2, all laboratory sessions were 
computerized using the z-Tree experiment software package (Fischbacher, 2007). Both the 
instructions and the information shown on the computer screen were in Chinese. The 
instruction handouts (see Appendix A.6) were read aloud for everyone in the same session to 
hear.  Each session lasted between 30 minutes and one hour (including the time for signing 
up, reading instructions, a quiz to guarantee the accurate understanding of the experimental 
rules, and final payments).  100 
 
        The experiment included 7 sessions (each had 6, 12, 18 or 24 subjects). In each session, 
I randomly assigned subjects to groups of two. Each session included 12 rounds. Group 
compositions were fixed during the experiment; this rule was made common knowledge. In 
each group, the two subjects play two different roles “Person A” and “Person B,” 
respectively. I used the natural terms “Person A” and “Person B” rather than “Trustor” and 
“Trustee” in the instruction to avoid any experimenter demand effect. The role was 
determined randomly by the computer at the beginning of the experiment. Each subject 
always played the assigned single role across the whole experiment. However, each group 
only knew their own stake path, but not those of other groups. 
        In each round, I endowed each subject with 14 yuan.
56 Then “Person A” was asked to 
pass X yuan to “Person B.” This number (X) might (or might not) vary over rounds and can 
be any even number between 0 and 14 (including 0 and 14), and it was known by both 
“Person A” and “Person B.” The path of X in all rounds depended on the treatment, and was 
told to subjects when the experiment started.   
       “Person A” first decided whether to pass X yuan or to pass nothing to “Person B.” That 
is to say, the amount of money that “Person A” passed should be either 0 or X yuan, not any 
other amount. If “Person A” chose NOT to pass X yuan, then each of “Person A” and 
“Person B” ended the round with 14 yuan; otherwise the X yuan sent out would be tripled to 
be 3X, and “Person B” then decided how much to return to “Person A.” “Person B” also had 
two choices: either to return 2X yuan, or to return 0.5X yuan. If “Person B” chose to return 
2X yuan, “Person A” ended the round with 14-X+2X=14+X yuan, and “Person B” ended the 
                                                 
56 In many trust games only trustors are endowed, which may underestimate trustees’ trustworthiness 
if they are inequality averse, and trustors’ trust if they expect the trustees have such an inequality 
aversion preference (Ciriolo, 2007). I adopt the design of equal endowment between trustors and 
trustees to avoid this confounding factor.  101 
 
round with 14+3X-2X=14+X yuan; so they earned an equal amount. If “Person B” chose to 
return 0.5X, “Person A” ended the round with 14-X+0.5X=14-0.5X yuan, and “Person B” 
ended the round with 14+3X-0.5X=14+2.5X yuan, respectively. Thus passing the stake is a 
trusting behavior, and returning twice the stake is a trustworthy one, while returning only 
half the stake harms the trustor and is considered as untrustworthy. 
        The above rule of each round was shown in Figure 3.1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The first (second) number in the terminal nodes indicates the earning of the trustor 
(trustee) in   that round.  
Figure 3.1: The Decision Tree in Each Round 
 
        In each round, the actions of “Person A” and “Person B” were known to each other 
immediately after the action. However, communication across subjects was not allowed.  
        The final payment was the performance payment plus a show-up fee of 10 yuan. At the 
end of the experiment, the computer randomly picked up one round from the 12 rounds; the 
performance payment was the earning in the chosen round.   
        The average payment (including the show-up fee) was 29.2 yuan and 33.4 yuan
57 for 
“Person A” (trustors) and “Person B” (trustees), respectively. The experimental design 
contributes to the advantageous position of trustees: no matter what choices are made by 
                                                 
57 The exchange rate when the experiments were conducted was about 1USD=6.5 yuan. 
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trustors and trustees, trustees never earn less than his partners (trustors), as shown in Figure 
3.1. These earnings could afford ordinary meals at student canteens for one to three days, 
and were sufficiently large to generate a good supply of subjects. Regarding the purchasing 
power, it is comparable to experimental payments (for one-hour experiments) in other 
countries. 
        At the end of the experiments, I asked subjects to complete a brief survey.  The survey 
collected information on age, gender, nationality, educational level, concentration at school, 
working status and income, in addition to eliciting risk preferences over lotteries.
58  
 
3.3.2.  Treatment Group Assignments  
        Each experiment consisted of three main treatments: “Big Bang,” “Semi-gradualism” 
and “Gradualism.” All groups in the three main treatments faced the same stake in the 
second half of the experiment (rounds 7-12); but the stake paths differed in the first half 
(rounds 1-6). The stakes over 12 rounds were shown in Figure 3.2: for the “Big Bang” 
treatment, the stakes were always at the highest level, which was 14; for the “Semi-
gradualism” treatment, they were two for the first six rounds and set at the highest stake for 
the next six rounds; for the “Gradualism” treatment, they increased from two to 12 with a 
step of two for the first six rounds and fixed at the highest stake for the next six rounds.  
                                                 
58 The questions on risk preferences were adopted from Holt and Laury (2002), but in a different 
currency unit (see Appendix A.2).  
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The vertical line between rounds 6 and 7 separates the two halves of the experiment. 
 
Figure 3.2: Stake Patterns of the Treatments 
 
 
        Since the stake paths for these treatments differed in rounds 1-6, it might have imposed 
an income effect in the laboratory. I adopted a standard way in the experimental literature to 
eliminate the income effect: randomly picking up one round, and using the earning of that 
round as the performance payment. Moreover, I randomized groups into various treatments, 
thus eliminating the potential effect of subjects’ incomes in the real world.  
        Table 3.2 shows that randomizations worked very well in assigning subjects into the 
treatments. The default treatment is “Gradualism,” so the constant shows the means for the 
“Gradualism” treatment, and the coefficients of “Big Bang” and “Semi-gradualism” show 
the differences between those two treatments and the “Gradualism” treatment. There is only 
one coefficient which is statistically significant from zero. 104 
 105 
 
3.4.  Results 
        In this section I analyze the effect of treatments on the following outcome variables per 
round: whether a trustor passes the stake, whether the trustee returns fairly conditional on 
the trustor sending, whether the group attains successful cooperation (i.e., whether the 
trustor sends and the trustee returns a fair amount), and the average earning of trustors, 
trustees and all subjects.   
 
        Result 1: in round 1, the sending rate is high and similar for all three treatments.  
        As  shown  in  Figure  3.3,  for  all treatments, the sending rates are above 90%. 
Surprisingly, even the “Big Bang” treatment has such a high trust rate, which may be due to 
the repeated feature of the game: the trustor may want to signal his “trust” to induce 
reciprocation from the trustee, or she may want to screen whether the trustee is trustworthy. 
Of course, in the context of repeated interactions, the sending rate, as the ratio of amount 
sent to the trustor’s endowment in continuous trust games, does not measure pure trusting 
attitudes. 106 
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Figure 3.3: Fraction of Trustors Sending 
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Samples are restricted to the case when the trustor passes the stake. 
Figure 3.4: Fraction of Trustees Returning Fairly Conditional on Trustor Sending 107 
 
 
        Result  2:  in  round  1,  conditional  on trustors sending, the fraction of trustees 
returning a fair amount is lower for the “Big Bang” treatment; there is no difference 
between the “Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism” treatments.  
        The trustworthiness rate varies across treatments (see Figure 3.4). With a low stake, 
above 90% of trustees returns fairly in the first round; with a high stake (in the “Big Bang” 
approach), only below 70% of them do so. This difference is statistically significant. The 
reason may be that the benefit from betrayal is much higher when the trustee faces a high 
stake: if this round is selected for the final payment, the trustee has a chance to earn 59 yuan 
(including a show-up fee of 10 yuan) if he returns a low amount, which more than triples 17 
yuan, the amount he will earn should he return a fair amount.   
        Figure 3.5 shows the rate of “successful cooperation” in each round. As mentioned 
above, cooperation of a group is defined as successful if both of the following conditions 
hold: the trustor sends the stake and the trustee returns a fair amount; otherwise it is 
considered as unsuccessful. So it is a product of trust and trustworthiness, and captures 
whether a group can achieve a Pareto outcome which has important meanings for certain 
policy aspects.  
       As a direct result of a high trust and a relatively lower trustworthiness in round 1, fewer 
groups in the “Bing Bang” treatment attain successful cooperation: about 65% of them are 
successful, versus a high rate above 85% for the other two treatments. There is no difference 
between the “Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism” treatments. 
 108 
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 Figure 3.5: Fraction of Successful Cooperation (Trustor Sending and Trustee Returning 
Fairly) 
 
        Result 3: from round 2, a gap appears between the sending rates of the “Big 
Bang” treatment and the other two treatments; there is no difference between the 
“Semi-gradualism” and “Gradualism” treatments. 
        The sending rate of the “Bing Bang” treatment decreases sharply from about 95% to 
70% in round 2, about 50% in round 6, and reaches a lowest of 40% in round 7, although it 
is temporally close to 80% in round 5. For the other two treatments, the sending rate 
fluctuates between 70% and 100%, but shows a general trend of slow decrease and reaches 
95% and 80% in round 6 for “Gradualism” and “Semi-gradualism” treatments, respectively. 
Although the gap between a sudden increase of stake (the “Semi-gradualism” treatment) and 
a gradual increase (the “Gradualism” treatment) is insignificant in most rounds, that between 109 
 
the “Big Bang” and “Gradualism” treatment remains until round 11, the second to the last 
round of the experiment, while that between the “Big Bang”  and “Semi-gradualism” only 
remains until round 9.   
        Given  the  relatively  lower  rate  of  trustworthiness in round 1 in the “Big Bang” 
treatment, the sharp decrease of trust from round 1 to round 2 in this treatment is 
understandable. Table 3.3 presents a formal regression to capture the effect of trustees’ 
behavior in the previous round on the trustors’ in the current round. The sample restricts to 
the case when the trustors do send in the previous round. Specification 2 further restricts the 
sample to the case when the stakes do not change in two consecutive rounds. Both 
specifications show that trustors do respond positively and largely to trustees’ 
trustworthiness in the previous round. This parallels conditional cooperation behaviors in 
public good games (e.g., Fischbacher et al., 2001). 
Table 3.3: The Effect of Early Trustworthiness on Trust 
 
Dependent Variable: Trustor Sending 
  Whole Sample  Restricted Sample 
  (1) (2) 
Trustee Return Fairly in the previous round  0.456***  0.499*** 
 (0.0250)  (0.0299) 
Constant 0.556***  0.554*** 
 (0.0738)  (0.0842) 
Round Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Individual Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1,053  775 
R-squared 0.550  0.606 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Probit regressions 
have qualitatively similar results. Specification 1 applies to all trustors in rounds 2-12 who 
trust in the previous round; specification 2 uses a subsample of specification 1 and only 
applies to the rounds when the stake does not change from the previous round, thus 
excluding round 7 for the “Semi-gradualism” treatment, and rounds 2-7 for the 
“Gradualism” treatment.  
 
        The  result  also  suggests  some  kind  of short-term tolerance in trustors’ response to 
trustees’ betrayal. The trustworthiness rate in the “Semi-gradualism” treatment decreases 110 
 
significantly in round 2 to slightly above 70% from a high 95% in round 1 and does not 
change from round 2 to round 3; but the trust rate for the “Semi-gradualism” treatment does 
not sharply decrease until round 4, which may show that the trustors tolerate the betrayal 
from trustees for one round (they could have stopped sending from round 3 should they 
become uncooperative), which parallels the finding by Fudenberg et al. (2011) in repeated 
prisoner’s dilemmas.  
        An obvious increase of trust rate is also found in round 5 for “Big Bang” and “Semi-
gradualism” treatments. To examine the potential reason, Figure 3.6 shows cooperation 
results of each group by treatment. For each group, the horizontal axis indicates the round, 
and the vertical axis has two stacked bars in each round: the lower bar indicates whether the 
trustor sends, while the upper bar  indicates whether the trustee returns fairly ; if the trustor 
does not send, both bars for the trustor and the trustee are empty (zero). On the top of the 
graph for each group is the 3- or 4-digit code for that group, which is constructed in the 
following way: the lowest two digits indicate the treatment type (1, 4, 7, 10=“Big Bang;” 2, 
5, 8, 11=“Semi-gradualism;” 3, 6, 9, 12=“Gradualism”); the highest one digit indicates the 
session number (1-7). 
        According to Figure 3.6, we can see that the increase of trust rate for the “Big Bang” 
treatment in round 5 is that five trustors switch from no sending to sending, four (one) of 
which are betrayed (reciprocated) in an early round, stop trusting by round 4, but try 
investing again in round 5. Similar cases apply for the “Semi-gradualism” treatment.  111 
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A: “Big Bang” Groups 
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B: “Semi-gradualism” Groups 
Figure 3.6: Group Cooperation Results for Each Group in Each Treatment 112 
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C: “Gradualism” Groups 
 
Figure 3.6 (Continued) 
 
        Result 4: The gap between the trustworthiness rates of the “Big Bang” treatment 
and the other two treatments maintains for the first six rounds, but the gap disappears 
after that.  
        Although we find a positive effect of a low beginning stake on trustworthiness in the 
first round, this effect is less persistent and the trustworthiness rate fluctuates (see Figure 
3.4). This result is not so surprising because those less trustworthy may have been screened 
out over rounds by the trustors based on trustees’ actions, so those still receiving money 
from the trustors in later rounds may be more trustworthy in nature. In addition, given a 
trustor keeps trusting and sending a high stake, some trustees may become reciprocating 113 
 
(even they may have betrayed in an early round); this suggests the coexistence of temptation 
to betray especially at a high stake and reciprocity to persistent trust.   
        For example, the trustworthiness rate of the “Semi-gradualism” increases from round 3 
to round 4 and reaches 90% again. If we look at Panel A of Figure 3.6 for more details, we 
can find that it is a result of two factors: first, three betrayers in earlier rounds are no longer 
invested in (i.e., trusted) by trustors, thus those trusted in round 4 are those more trustworthy 
in nature (a screening effect); second, two trustees who betrayed in rounds 3 reciprocate the 
tolerance of the trustors (a reciprocation effect). The (conditional) trustworthiness rate of the 
“Big Bang” treatment increases in rounds 6 and 7, but it seems that it is all due to the 
screening effect: trustors betrayed in round 5 do not invest anymore. So the screening effect 
seems to dominate overall. 
        Due to the binary decision nature of the trustors, we cannot run a formal regression of 
trustworthiness on trust in the same round as conducted in the literature of continuous trust 
games. However, the ratio of trustees returning fairly (conditional on trustors sending the 
stake) is always higher than 50% for all treatments except for the end round, and is still 
about 40% in the end round, which does suggest some reciprocity.
59 Moreover, as shown 
above, there are suggestive evidences that some trustees who have betrayed earlier start 
rewarding trustors if the trustors tolerate their betrayals and keep investing in trustees.  
        As a consequence of results 3 and 4, the gap between the rate of successful cooperation 
of the “Big Bang” treatment and the other two treatments maintains for the first seven 
rounds, but the gap is unobvious after that.  
                                                 
59 Of course, this may not reflect pure reciprocity and may involve fairness concern or altruism (Cox, 
2004).  114 
 
        Figures 7-9 explore earnings of trustors, trustees, and all subjects in each round for all 
three treatments. It is not surprising that the “Big Bang” treatment has the highest average 
earning at the beginning for trustors, trustees and both, since it has a higher earning potential 
with a high stake and the rates of trust and trustworthiness are all above 70%. However, this 
advantage of “Big Bang” treatment disappears after 4-5 rounds when cooperation falls apart, 
and the “Gradualism” treatment becomes dominant for several rounds until near the end 
(rounds 10-12). The “Semi-gradualism” treatment has lowest earnings for the first half 
(rounds 1-6) due to the low stake (low earning potential), but there is no significant 
difference between it and the “Gradualism” treatment after that when they both face the 
same stake.  
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Figure 3.7: Average Earning for Trustors 
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Figure 3.8: Average Earning for Trustees 
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Figure 3.9: Average Earning for Both Trustors and Trustees 116 
 
 
        The results regarding individual earnings lead to mixed policy implications. The “Big 
Bang” approach may not be bad for social welfare if the time horizon is relatively short (as 
long as it is long enough for the selfish trustees to reciprocate in the beginning interactions), 
but starting with a low stake may lead to higher social welfare if there are many high-stake 
investment opportunities with the same partner: starting with a low stake helps remain high 
trust and trustworthiness except in the end rounds, which yields more profits for both parties 
when the stake becomes high. 
        Table 3.4 presents the differences among different treatments regarding the rates of 
trust, trustworthiness and successful cooperation in rounds 7-12 with the high stake. It 
employs a regression form: the default treatment is “Gradualism,” so the constant coefficient 
shows the means for the “Gradualism” treatment, and the coefficients of “Big Bang” and 
“Semi-gradualism” show the differences between those two treatments and the 
“Gradualism” treatment. It clearly shows that starting at a low stake leads to a higher trust 
rate (except the end round) in rounds 7-12, but not a higher trustworthiness rate, and a 
higher rate of successful cooperation only in round 7. No difference between a gradual 
increase (the “Gradualism” treatment) in stake and a sudden increase (the “Semi-
gradualism” treatment) is detected.  
 117 
 118 
 
         Result 5: There is an end-of-game effect: in the last round the rates of trust, 
trustworthiness and successful cooperation fall sharply for all three treatments; there 
is no performance difference among these three treatments. 
          This shows that although starting at the low stake helps achieve trust at a high stake, it 
cannot solve the end-of-game effect in which both trust and trustworthiness fall apart. This 
is partly consistent with the standard economic theory and the similar effect found in 
finitely-repeated continuous public good experiments, as well as other studies on finitely-
repeated trust game (Cochard et al., 2004; Engle-warnick & Slonim, 2004) and market 
(buyer-seller) game (Bolton et al., 2004).
60 However, the rates of trust and trustworthiness in 
the last round are both about 40%, which is far from zero predicted by the standard theory.  
 
3.5.  Conclusion and Discussion 
        The findings in this chapter show that gradualism -- defined as increasing the stake 
level of investment step by step – outperforms the big bang approach to a certain extent: 
although the initial trust is high no matter how large the stake is, starting at a low stake leads 
to a higher initial trustworthiness and thus higher trust in subsequent interactions. I do not 
detect the difference in trust levels between a sudden increase in stake and a gradual 
increase. Unfortunately, trustworthiness and trust for all treatments sharply decrease in the 
end, suggesting gradualism has its limitations in finite repetitions. Future studies are desired 
to examine whether gradualism outperforms the big bang approach in all high-stake rounds 
when repetitions are infinite, or whether combining gradualism with perfect monitoring, 
                                                 
60 Engle-warnick and Slonim (2004) compares finitely-repeated and infinite-repeated trust games, 
and find that the level of trust  is indistinguishable between these two when subjects are 
inexperienced. However, as subjects gain experience, the level of trust decreases in the finite game 
but does not change in the infinite game. 119 
 
social pressure, sanctions or other institutions helps it avoid the end-of-game effect in finite 
plays.   
        In  this  experiment  in  each  round the trustor can only decide to send a certain 
predetermined amount (the stake) or not, rather than send any amount freely.  This reflects 
many cases in the real world when the trustor decides whether to invest in a project with a 
certain stake. The binary choice nature with an exogenous stake, which is known to both 
trustors and trustees, may have helped overcome the dilemma faced by the trustors (“first 
movers”): if they do not send all or almost all of what they can, the trustees may not feel 
really trusted and thus not reciprocate to reward the trustors; but if they send all, they expose 
themselves to a huge risk (Pillutla et al., 2003). Comparing the exogenously gradual (and 
binary) approach in this experiment with the method of completely free choices deserves 
future experimental explorations.  
        This chapter only studies finitely-repeated trust games. It would be also interesting to 
compare finite plays with one-shot games as well as infinite plays. I leave this for future 
studies.  
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APPENDIX 121 
 
A.1   Experimental Instructions for Coordination Experiments 1-3
61 
 
        The  study  is  conducted  anonymously. Subjects will be identified only by code 
numbers. There is no communication among the subjects. The experiment will last from 30 
minutes to one hour. Please raise your hand if anything is unclear to you.  
 
Experiment Structure 
        This experiment will consist of two independent stages. You will receive instructions 
for each stage on the screen before that stage begins. [For experiments 2 and 3: You will be 
told the exact number of periods of each stage when you enter that stage.] In each stage, you 
are playing in a group of 4 members (including yourself). For each stage, the group 
members are randomly selected and would NOT change during that stage. However, the 
groups would be reshuffled in new groups after the first stage. 
Rule of Each Period 
        Please note that the experiment consists of two stages, and each stage has some periods. 
The following rule applies to each period.  
        In each period, you are assigned an endowment of 20 points, and asked to give a stated 
amount to a group pool. The stated amount may (or may not) change across periods. In each 
period you can decide whether not to give, or to give exactly that amount, but can not give 
other points. [For experiments 2 and 3: At the beginning of each stage, you will be told the 
                                                 
61 Coordination Experiments 1-3 refer to the weakest-link experiment with limited information feedback, the 
weakest-link experiment with richer information feedback, and the non-weakest-link experiment, respectively.  
Chapter 1 discusses only coordination experiment 1, while Chapter 2 discusses all three. Original 
instructions are in Chinese. Contents in square brackets are only shown to subjects of the specific 
experiment(s) (“For experiment(s) X” is not shown). Subjects in one experiment are not aware of 
other experiments. 122 
 
values of these stated amounts of all periods in that stage.] You cannot know others’ choices 
when you make your own decision. [For experiment 1: After each period, you will know 
whether all your group members (including yourself) give the stated amount, but if not all of 
you give, you will not know how many members give.] [For experiments 2 and 3: After 
each period, you will know how many members in your group (including yourself) give the 
stated amount.] 
 
        [For experiments 1 and 2: 
        If all 4 members of your group (including yourself) give the stated amount, you will get 
twice that amount back (thus having a net return equaling that amount). But if not all of your 
group members give, you will NOT get any of your given points back and will thus end the 
period with only the points you do not give.  
        So in each period, your earning will depend on the following cases:  
        Case 1: If all 4 members give the stated amount, then you earn: 20+that amount 
        Case 2: If you give, but not all other 3 members give, then you earn: 20-that amount 
        Case 3: If you do not give, no matte whether other members give or not, then you earn: 
20 
        A special case of Case 3 is as follows: 
  Case 4: If all 4 members do not give, then you earn 20 (each of 4 members earns 
20) 
        ] 
        [For experiment 3: 123 
 
        If at least three members of your group (including yourself) give the stated amount, you 
will get twice that amount back (no matter whether you give that amount or not); if all 4 
members give, the extra amount will be equally divided for all 4 members. But if fewer than 
three members give, you will NOT get any of your given points back and will thus end the 
period with only the points you do not give.  
        The table below lists your earning in each period for different cases. X indicates the 
stated amount each one is asked to give.   
Your Choice  The Number of Other Group  
Members Who Give 
Your earning 
Give 3  20-X+2X+X/4 ＝ 
20+1.25X 
Give 2  20-X+2X         ＝20+X 
Give <2  20-X 
Not Give  3  20+2X      
Not Give  <3  20 
        ] 
Examples 
        [For experiments 1 and 2: 
        Example 1: You are asked to give 10 points. You give, and all other group members 
also give. Then in this period each of you earns 20+10=30 points. 
        Example 2: You are asked to give 10 points. You give, two other group members also 
give, but the last one does not. Then in this period, each of you and the other two members 
earns 20-10=10 points, while the last member earns 20 points. 
        Example 3: You are asked to give 10 points. You do not give, but all other group 
members give. Then in this period you earn 20 points, and each of the three other members 
earns 20-10=10 points. 
        ] 124 
 
        [For experiment 3: 
        Example 1: You are asked to give 10 points. You give, and all other group members 
also give. Then in this period each of you earns 20+1.25*10=32.5 points. 
 
        Example 2: You are asked to give 10 points. You give, two other group members also 
give, but the last one does not. Then in this period, each of you and the other two members 
earns 20+10=30 points, while the last member earns 20+2*10=40 points. 
        Example 3: You are asked to give 10 points. You give, but only one of the other three 
group members gives. Then in this period, each of you and the other one who gives earns 
20-10=10 points, while the other two member earns 20 points each. 
        Example 4: You are asked to give 10 points. You do not give, but all other three group 
members give. Then in this period you earn 20+2*10=40 points, and each of the other three 
members earns 20+10=30 points. 
        Example 5: You are asked to give 10 points. You do not give, and only two of the other 
three group members give. Then in this period each of you and the other one who does not 
give earns 20 points, and each of the two members who give earns 20-10=10 points. 
        ] 
        We will have examinations on the computer to make sure you understand the rule. You 
can start the experiment only after you answer all questions correctly.  
 
Payment 125 
 
        [For experiment 1: Your final payment for this experiment is the sum of two parts. The 
first is a show-up fee of about 400 points.
62 The second is a performance payment, i.e., the 
sum of your earnings from all periods in two stages. The conversion rate is 40 points = 
¥1.00. All payments will be in cash. ] 
 
        [For experiments 2 and 3: Your final payment for this experiment is the sum of three 
parts. The first is your earning from the first stage: at the end of the experiment, the 
computer will randomly pick up one period from the first stage and shows it on your 
computer screen (this period will apply to all subjects in this session); your earning in the 
first stage is that in the chosen period times the number of periods in the first stage, while 
your earning in other periods of the first stage will be discarded. The second is the sum of 
your earnings from all periods in the second stage. The third is a show-up fee of ¥10. The 
conversion rate is 30 points = ¥1.00. All payments will be in cash. ] 
 
 
        At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to fill out a simple questionnaire. Then 
you can collect your earnings by presenting your code number to the supervisor. Your 
earnings will be in an envelope marked with your code number.  
 
 
                                                 
62 For sessions without the “High Show-up Fee” treatment, it is stated as “a show-up fee of 400 
points.”  126 
 
A.2   Risk Aversion Questions 
 
Your code___ ______ 
 
        In the table below, you are presented with a choice between two lotteries, A or B, along 
with the payoff matrix for each lottery.  
        For example, the first row shows that lottery A offers a 10% chance of receiving ¥20.00 
and a 90% chance of receiving ¥16.00. Similarly, lottery B offers a 10% chance of receiving 
¥38.50 and a 90% chance of ¥1.00. 
        In the third table column, simply indicate given the two lotteries in each row, which 
one would you prefer if you are given the choice? A or B for each row? 
Lottery A  Lottery B  Your lottery choice 
prob(¥20.00)  prob(¥16.00)  prob(¥38.50)  prob(¥1.00)      
                                  
0.1 ¥20.00 0.9 ¥16.00  0.1 ¥38.50  0.9 ¥1.00        
                                  
0.2  ¥20.00  0.8 ¥16.00  0.2 ¥38.50  0.8 ¥1.00           
                                  
0.3  ¥20.00  0.7 ¥16.00  0.3 ¥38.50  0.7 ¥1.00           
                                  
0.4  ¥20.00  0.6 ¥16.00  0.4 ¥38.50  0.6 ¥1.00           
                                  
0.5  ¥20.00  0.5 ¥16.00  0.5 ¥38.50  0.5 ¥1.00           
                                  
0.6  ¥20.00  0.4 ¥16.00  0.6 ¥38.50  0.4 ¥1.00           
                                  
0.7  ¥20.00  0.3 ¥16.00  0.7 ¥38.50  0.3 ¥1.00           
                                  
0.8  ¥20.00  0.2 ¥16.00  0.8 ¥38.50  0.2 ¥1.00           
                                  
0.9 ¥20.00 0.1 ¥16.00  0.9 ¥38.50  0.1 ¥1.00        
                          
1  ¥20.00  0 ¥16.00  1 ¥38.50  0 ¥1.00           
                                   127 
 
A.3   Proof of Lemma 2.1 
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A.4   Proof of Proposition 2.1 
Proposition 2.1. The lower the  1 Th , the higher the probability that the coordination at t=1 
will succeed.  
Proof: since  ,1 1 ,1 1 1 /( ) / 0
ii
jj s Th F Th Th       , 10    ,  ,, (1 ) (1 ) 0
ii
jt jt ss     , then 
,, 1 [(1 ) (1 )]/ 0
ii
jt jt
ji
ss T h 

    . But  11 () / 0 i Th Th    . According to (2.1), the lower 
the  1 Th , the higher the probability the LHS of (2.1) will be larger than the RHS, i.e., the 
higher the probability that a level-1 player i will contribute at t=1. 
        For a level-2 player k, she will contribute if and only if she believes that the probability 
that all her opponents (in her mind all her opponents are level-1 players) will give is larger 
than or equal to  ( ) kt Th  , her “reserve probability of success.” Since a level-2 player knows 
the strategy rule of level-1 players, she believes (correctly expects) that the lower the  1 Th , 
the higher the probability that a level-1 player i will contribute at t=1. So the lower the  1 Th , 
the higher the probability that a level-2 player k will contribute at t=1.
63  
        For  a  level-0  player  j, the probability that she will give is 
(1 )1( ) 1( ) j tj t BT h BT h     , where 1( )   equals one if the argument in the parenthesis is 
true, and zero otherwise, and  j B  is her willingness-to-give. Given (1 )    , it is obvious 
that the lower the  1 Th , the higher the probability that a level-0 player j will contribute at t=1.  
        As shown above, the lower the  1 Th , the higher the probability that any level-0, level-1 
and level-2 player will contribute at t=1, so the higher the probability that the coordination at 
t=1 will succeed. Q.E.D. 
                                                 
63 Due to the similar reason, the lower the  1 Th , the higher the probability that a level-3, lever-4 player 
will contribute at t=1, etc. So Proposition 2.1 holds for general level-k thinking.  129 
 
A.5   Supplementary Sessions of Limited-information Weakest-link 
Experiments 
 
        To  further  check  whether  the  difference of the gradualism effect in coordination 
experiments 1 and 2 in Chapter 2 (the two weakest-link experiments) is driven by the 
information about the exact number of contributors, I ran several further sessions (five 
groups for each treatment) of weakest-link experiments with limited information. The design 
of these sessions is identical to experiment 2 except that subjects are told whether 
coordination is successful but not the exact number of group members contributing (if less 
than four contribute), and they were conducted in the same laboratory as experiment 2 in 
July 2011. This is to confirm that the different effects of gradualism between experiments 1 
and 2 are not due to other factors (e.g., location, payment method, conversion rate, and 
information about the number of periods and stake trend).  
        The results are shown in Figures A.1 – A.3 and summarized as below. First, success 
rates are lower in these sessions than in experiment 2 (it is also lower than experiment 1.) 
Second, the consistency of success/failure over periods is more obvious than in experiment 
2. Third, no failed “Big Bang” groups can become successful.  
        Although the sample size of these sessions is small, it is clear that their results are more 
similar with experiment 1 rather than experiment 2. So the difference between experiments 1 
and 2 is mostly due to the information regarding the exact number of contributors. 130 
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Figure A.1   Success Rates of Groups by Treatment and Period for Supplementary Sessions 
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Figure A.2   Contribution Rates by Treatment and Period for Supplementary Sessions 
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Figure A.3   Individual Earnings by Treatment and Period for Supplementary Sessions 
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A.6: Experimental Instruction for the Trust Experiment in Chapter 3 
 
        The  study  is  conducted  anonymously. Subjects will be identified only by code 
numbers. There is no communication among the subjects. The experiment will last from 30 
minutes to one hour. Please raise your hand if anything is unclear to you.  
 
Experiment Structure 
        There will be two roles in this experiment: “Person A” and “Person B.” Each of you 
only plays one of these two roles during the whole experiment. Your role will be determined 
randomly by the computer at the beginning of the experiment.  
        The  experiment  includes  12  rounds. You will be randomly matched with another 
person who plays the opposite rule: if you play role A, the other will play role B; if you play 
role B, the other will play role A. You will play with the same person during the whole 
experiment.  
 
Rule of Each Period 
        Please  note  that  the  experiment  has 12 rounds. The following rule applies to each 
round.  
        In each round, each of you receives an endowment of 14 yuan. Then “Person A” will 
be asked to pass X yuan to “Person B.” This number (X) may (or may not) vary over rounds 
and can be any even number between 0 and 14 (including 0 and 14), and it is known by both 
“Person A” and “Person B.” The path of X in all rounds depends on the group you are in, 
and will be told to you when the experiment starts. 133 
 
         “Person A” first decides whether to pass X yuan or to pass nothing to “Person B.” That 
is to say, the amount of money that “Person A” passes should be either 0 or X yuan, not any 
other number. If “Person A” chooses NOT to pass X yuan, then each of “Person A” and 
“Person B” ends the round with 14 yuan. Otherwise the X yuan sent out will be tripled to be 
3X.  “Person B” knows the decision of “Person A” after “Person A” makes a decision. Then 
“Person B” decides how many points to return to “Person A.” “Person B” also has two 
choices: either to return 2X yuan, or to return 0.5X yuan. If “Person B” chooses to return 2X 
yuan, “Person A” ends the round with 14-X+2X=14+X yuan, and “Person B” ends the round 
with 14+3X-2X=14+X yuan, respectively; if “Person B” chooses to return 0.5X, “Person A” 
ends the round with 14-X+0.5X=14-0.5X yuan, and “Person B” ends the round with 14+3X-
0.5X=14+2.5X yuan, respectively. 
        The above rule of each round is shown in the table below.  
Person A’s choice  Person B’s 
choice 
Person A’s earning 
for this round 
Person B’s earning 
for this round 
Pass 0    14  14 
Pass X  Return 2X  14+X  14+X 
Return 0.5X  14-0.5X  14+2.5X 
  
        In each round, the actions of “Person A” and “Person B” are known to each other after 
each action.  
Examples 
        Example 1: “Person A” is asked to pass 10 yuan to “Person B.” “Person A” passes 10 
yuan, so the 10 yuan triple to be 30 yuan. Then “Person B” returns 2*10=20 yuan. In this 
round “Person A” earns 14-10+20=24 yuan, while “Person B” earns 14+30-20=24 yuan. 
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        Example 2: “Person A” is asked to pass 10 yuan to “Person B.” “Person A” passes 10 
yuan, so the 10 yuan triple to be 30 yuan. Then “Person B” returns 0.5*10=5 yuan. In this 
round “Person A” earns 14-10+5=9 yuan, while “Person B” earns 14+30-5=39 yuan. 
 
        Example 3: “Person A” is asked to pass 10 yuan to “Person B.” “Person A” does not 
pass. In this round each of “Person A” and “Person B” earns 14 yuan. 
        We will have examinations on the computer to make sure you understand the rule. You 
can start the experiment only after you answer all questions correctly.  
 
Payment 
        Your  final  payment  for  this  experiment is the sum of two parts. The first is your 
performance payment: at the end of the experiment, the computer will randomly pick up one 
round from the 12 rounds and shows it on your computer screen (this round will apply to all 
subjects in this session); your performance payment is your earning in the chosen round, 
while your earning in other rounds will be discarded. The second is a show-up fee of ¥10. 
All payments will be in cash.  
        At the end of the experiment, you will be asked to fill out a simple questionnaire. Then 
you can collect your earnings by presenting your code number to the supervisor. Your 
earnings will be in an envelope marked with your code number.  
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